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1INTRODUCTION: FRANCIS BACON'S ADVANCEMENT,
THE NEW SCIENTIFIC METHOD, AND THE RHETORICAL TRADITION
The purpose of this study is to re-evaluate Francis Bacon'srhetorical theory andits
relation to theprocess of invention for theadvancement of knowledge. It will begin by
articulating Bacon's goalsas set forth in theAdvancement ofLearning, by looking at his
workagainstthe background of therhetorical tradition, andby introducing hisdefinition of
rhetoric in terms of his faculty psychology. In the following chapters, this work then
proceeds to illustrate the limitations of previous scholarship in its estimation of Bacon's
rhetorical theory and thus to expand the discussionstarted in this introduction so as to
recommend a further and richer interpretation concerning the intimaterelation between
Bacon's rhetorical theory and his scientific method.
Karl Wallace has noted that Bacon's Advancement ofLearning is most valuable for
studying Bacon's theoryof rhetoric. Bacon heredealsmore fully than any otherplacewith
the nature and particular function of the art of rhetoric andwith its place in relation to other
arts. But even here, as Wallace also notes. Bacon's work does not intend nor deliver any
well-developed or systematic theoryof rhetoric, andany studyis thus required to provide
considerable interpretation. The present work, as it attempts to set forth as accurately as
possible a picture of Bacon's views on the proper role of rhetoric, relies heavily on the
Advancement ofLearning. Qtations to the Advancement throughout the work are from
Arthur Johnston's edition. The Advancement ofLearning andNewAtlantis (Oxford,
1974). Where it is necessary to provide additional illustration from other of Bacon's
works, I have cited from J. Spedding, R. L. Ellis, and D. D. Heath, The Works ofFrancis
Bacon (London, 1864). References to this edition in the text provide both volume and
page number for convenience.
Francis Bacon's Advancement and the New Method
The constant subject forFrancis Bacon's lectures andvarious publications fromhis
early Valerius Terminus published in 1603 to his DeAugmentis Scientiarum published in
1623 was the pursuitof reformfor traditional leaming and theconcept of a newmethod of
investigation and call for a newexperimental approach toknowledge. Bacon'sworkall
aimed towardhis larger life-project, theGreat Instauration, whichwas to be divided into
sixparts that togetherwouldpresenta complete systemof science. Baconintendedthe
Instauration to review all receivedphilosophies, to advance reformsfor leaming, and to lay
the foundation for a new scientific study of nature by way of direct observation and
experimentation.
TheAdvancement ofLearning in 1605 was the first of Bacon's philosophical
writings to be published. Bacon suggests that someaccount of the first part of the
Instauration could be found in the second book of theAdvancement and in its revised and
enlargedversion, theDe Augmentis. Baconin TheAdvancement ofLearning takes upon
himself the task of surveying all matters "concerningthe excellencyof the merit and true
gloryin the augmentation and propagation thereof and"what the particular acts andworks
are, which have been embraced and undertaken for the advancement of leaming; and again,
what defects and undervalues I find in such particular acts..." (5). Bacon's concern in the
Advancement is centered on the inadequacy in the seventeenth century of existing
knowledge and on the need for its advancement, the deficiencies that have prevented such
advancement, and the new method of invention by which, Bacon argues, progress is
possible.
Bacon's ideal objective, then, "the total reconstmction of the sciences, arts and all
human knowledge," proceeds in Book I of theAdvancementwith an explicit challenge to
the authority of all received philosophic traditions both past and present, which, he argues,
have been accepted as true and which, in their assumption that all knowledge has been
discovered, inhibit the processof learning. He attacks the universities and the reigning
schoolsof thought and levelshis severest criticism againstmedieval philosophy for what
he sees as an attachment to the influence of Aristotle. Bacon denounces those who rely
complacently on authority andassume thatthey have cometoknow andwhohavebeen
corruptedby the Idols of theMind and have, in fact, "by tradition, credulity, and
negligence" (Works Vm 78)received only oneside of the argument. Bacon'sattack on the
authority of traditional learningopens the argument for furtherdiscovery and invention-
and, it would seem, theway for rhetoric to resumeits positionat the core of this processof
discovery.
However, we must first consider Bacon's comments concerning the art of invention
in Book n of the Advancemeni. The primary concern of Book II is the classification of
knowledge and as such, it works to explicate the placeof rhetoric in Bacon's design for the
advancement ofknowledge. Bacon intends in Book II to pursue a complete system for
classifying knowledge that would omit nothingand by which he might identify those
branches that are wanting and in need of further investigation and those, as well, that are as
yet unexplored but are necessary to advance learning. He intends, then, not only to pursue
a survey ofknowledge, but also to classify and assess the kinds of learning that are
"excellent" and those that are lacking or uncultivated. He proceeds in the Advancement to
divide all knowledge into history, poesy, and philosophy. He briefly treats history and
poesy and then moves to treat as the main topic of Book II the third part of knowledge,
which he classifies as philosophy and claims as the general category for all sciences. In his
discussion of philosophy, he distinguishes between divine philosophy, by which he means
inspired or revealed theology, and the coordinate divisions he calls natural philosophy or
natural science and human philosophy or the sciences ofman and society. As he comes in
the rest of his system to discuss human and civil philosophy, and particularly those
sciences that concern man's mind rather than his body, he makes a further distinction
between thesciences of logic and ethics. Heproceeds then to consider at length hiscentral
interest - the four logical disciplines or thefour "arts intellectual": invention, judgment,
memory, and elocution.
Bacon borrows thesefourintellectual arts from thefiveclassical divisions thathad
traditionally been associated with rhetoric. Samuel Wilbur Howell notes, however, that for
Bacon, these arts havemuch broadermeaning. They are arts that underlienot any single
discipline, but all thevarious disciplines in his system ofknowledge (Logic 366). These
four processes, then, underlie thecomprehensive general reorganization of learning that
Bacon advocates. But Bacon's first and central concern with the intellectual arts is with the
art of invention. It is here, in his discussion of invention, that he makes a distinction
between the invention of arts and sciencesand the inventionof speech and arguments. As
for the invention of arts and science. Bacon attacks what has been previously offered by
way of logic. Bacon sees this partof invention ashitherto greatly deficient andmuch
wanting. Heargues that traditional, deductive logic "doth not pretend to invent sciences"
{Advancement n 118). And the form of induction thathadbeen advanced bypast
philosophers is "utterly vicious and incompetent" {Advancement n 120). Ashe moves,
then, to consider the inventionof speechandargument, he finds that "the use of this
invention is no other but, out of the knowledgewhereof our mind is already possessed, to
draw forth or call beforeus thatwhichmay bepertinent to thepurposewhichwe t^e into
our consideration" {Advancement II122). As,such, he states that "it is no invention, but a
remembranceor suggestion...." He allows it to be called invention, though, so long as it
be understood that "the scope andendof this invention is readiness andpresent useof our
knowledge, and not additionand amplification thereof {Advancement n 122). Bacon then
introduces here what he called his "new logic," that of induction, by which man might
through direct sensory experience andobservation discover knowledge that no one had
known before.
Francis Bacon^s Advancement and The Rhetorical Tradition
Mostrecognized andwidely accepted scholarship concerning Bacon's philosophical
work asserts that his work is characteristic of the Renaissance in that it exemplifies the wide
and sweeping changes thatprevailed andarethought tomark a significant transition from
scholastic to modem times. Much of the scholarship agrees that Bacon succeeded in his
objective to reformthe sciences andartsof human knowledge, andit generally agrees, as
Fulton H. Anderson says, that even if many of the principles that constitute Bacon's
philosophy had been entertained by others before him, the amplification andmodification
of these"in light of a new aim and a newmethod" marks "a departure from all the
philosophies that had gone before" (20). Howellsuggests as well, and perhapsmore
importantly for my purpose here, thatBacon's treatise, The Advancement ofLearnings and
what he finds to be Bacon's modem concept of rhetoricmark a significant departure in
ancient theories of rhetoric that prevailed in centuriesprior ("RenaissanceRhetoric" 293).
It's Howell's view that one of the most importantchanges in the theory of rhetoric
in the Renaissance concemed rhetoric's relation to invention (299). According to Howell,
Bacon's treatiserepresented the ideasof his era in denying to rhetoric the priority of
invention and aligning invention, instead, with the methodsof scientific investigation.
Bacon's work advocated a new science that combined direct experimentation, careful
observation and classification, and an inductive logic that he believed would lead to certain
knowledge and reveal trath as to the nature of reality. And, Howell argues, the distinction
Bacon makes between invention and rhetoric was critical to his notion of the progress of
science and the advancement of knowledge. Bacon centered his new philosophy and
method of science on new knowledge attained through original invention and discovery. In
doing so he made a distinctionbetween inventionas a scientific method for revealing new
knowledge and invention in the art of discourse, or rhetoric, as a procedure for selecting
and arranging information already discovered. Bacon effectively appropriated the method
of inventio as the investigation and discovery of ideas and lines of argument for the
sciences and re-assigned it only a secondary place in rhetoric, contributive to its function of
arranging and presenting ideas for public presentation.
Howell suggests that the Renaissance and specifically the work ofFrancis Bacon
might be regarded, at least as far as the purpose of rhetoric and the place of inventio is
concerned, as marking the end of one era and the beginning of another (292). As Bacon
claimed for science exclusive control over invention,rhetoricwas relegated to a secondary
position,was left onlywith style anddelivery and limited to persuading popularopinion
toward ideas already discovered by methods of logic and science. Howell asserts that these
changes are vitally important to the growthof modem rhetoric and notes that they have
deep roots in the ancient world.
Certainly, the relationship between rhetoric and invention raises important and
complex theoretical issues for the historyof rhetoric, but the dispute conceming the relation
between rhetoric and invention did not begmwithBacon in the Renaissance; rather, it
proceeds from the argument between the sophists and Plato in ancient Greece and can be
tracedwell through the sixteenth century. For themostpart the dispute is focusedaround
the subject of invention andwhether rhetoric works through language andargument to
constructknowledgeor whether it worksmerely to conveyknowledge that lies outsideits
province, as discovered in philosophy and science. I would argue, then, that the changes
Howell identifies represent epistemological differences conceming thenature of knowledge
and its relation to rhetoric that do notsomuch originate with Bacon or evenduring the
Renaissance as they exemplify differences that canbeviewed asgenuinely vital forces in
early Greek and Roman and through medieval and Renaissance rhetoric.
Before attempting to evaluate Bacon's ownconception of rhetoric's relation to
invention, it is important to review briefly the controversy as to thenature of invention in
rhetoric and its rival arts, as it unfolds inpre-Socratic, classical, medieval, and early
Renaissance scholarship. The following review willprovidea necessary historical
background for theories of rhetoric and theinvention of knowledge.
Thepowerand theimportance ofrhetoric were certainly already known toHomer
and theearlypoets and to thepre-Socratic philosopher Empedocles, whomightbe
considered a beneficiary of theHomeric tradition andan inventor of earlyrhetoric (Enos
61),but the formulization of rhetoric and itsestablishment as a discipline weredue
primarily to theactivities of thesophists. While any reconstruction of thesophistic
movementwill necessarily be only partial, it is, nevertheless, possiblein reviewing
individual sophists to ascertain a common preoccupation with a theory of knowledge, the
nature of truth, and the relation between language, thought, and reality (Enos 61, Kerferd
2,Untersteiner xv). Protagoras, to whom ancient historian Diogenes Laertius attributed the
doctrineof the anti logoi (Untersteiner 19), andGorgias, whowas the beneficiary of a
philosophical traditionthat he was able to develop, stabilize, and standardize into a
markedly sophisticated system of rhetoric, have been identified as themostwell-known of
the sophists (Enos74; Ijsseling27;Kerferd 42). The philosophical concept of opposing
logoi means to assert that on everymatter thereare twoopposing points of view and that
on anyquestion an individual can take either position anddebate it with success. But the
conceptof two logoi in opposition worksasmore thana rhetorical statement: it holds
significant theoretical implications as to the nature of knowledge (Freeman 348, Kerferd
86). Both Protagoras and Gorgias believed that knowledge is bound to human experience,
limited to senseperceptionandconfined by context, and so is relative and controversial.
Bothquestioned the validityof absolute certainties anddenied the existence of an objective
knowable truth. And because they believed that absolute truth is unknowable, perhaps
even nonexistent, they turned to rhetoric and the theoryof anti logoi as an intellectual
method of inquiry for the invention of knowledge. They believed that while the search for
transcendent truth is futile, a system of rhetoric, a method of investigation based on arguing
from contrary positions and directed by stylisticdevices and modes of arrangement, is
essential in coming-to-know, in constructing truth by way of consensus for the sake of
generating probable and only partial knowledge.
Plato's attitude towards the method of knowing and the relation between rhetoric
and knowledge advocated by the sophistic movement represents a significant departure
from such views, a departure tiiat reflects a fundamental and irreconcilable rift between two
conflicting epistemologies (Enos 63; Kennedy, APG 15). Plato was philosophically
opposed to the sophists' view of the world and thus to the starting point for the view of
rhetoric they held. In contrast to the sophists' assertion that humans cannot attain
knowledge of absolutes or of essences or essential truths and that rhetoric is thus a
necessity for achieving probable knowledge through consensus, Plato believed that
essential truth exists and is attainable not by rhetoric, which he believed can work to
conceal truth, but by way of philosophical inquiry, which he believed seeks to discover the
certain and the transcendent. Plato agreed that senses are limited and often inaccurate in
acquiring knowledge, but he asserted that knowledge cannot be reduced merely to
perception and probability and suggested, rather, that humans ought to look further for the
truth, for more permanent, transcendent knowledge. And so in the Gorgias Plato makes a
clear distinction between rhetoric, a counterfeit sophistic activity that is unable to provide
knowledge and so is concerned only with belief and illusion and provides only
appearances, and philosophy, one of the genuinely scientific pursuits he calls technai. And
he distinguishes, as well, between the method of antilogic, a method that encourages
indirection and frivolity, and the method of dialectic, which provides a formal, logical
system of argumentation by question and answer that seeks to attain a teloSy a universally
affirmed, immutable end (Enos 95). Plato believed, finally, that knowledge of the truth can
be obtained not in practicing rhetoric, but by studyingphilosophy.
Aristotle in his Rhetoric voices his opposition to earlier sophistic methods, but
goes on, as well, to answer the objections to rhetoric Plato raises in the Gorgias and
moves, then, to sanction rhetoric as an intellectually rigorous techne and a legitimate and
serious discipline (Enos 58). Aristode believed that sophistic methods were inadequate
because they had been motivated by nonintellectual and nonrational thinking and so moved
to respond to Plato's objections by recommending for rhetoric a rational system of
argument (Bizzell and Herzberg 145; Enos 59).
Aristotle attempted to treat rhetoric "philosophically" or scientifically by reducing it
to a system of classifications with distinctions and divisions and sub-divisions. He begins
his classification by stating that "rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic" (151). Aristotie
thus challenges Plato's subordination of rhetoric to dialectic, or philosophy, and suggests,
in fact, that rhetoric and dialectic do not differ so much in nature or in function as in
structure and form. Aristotie identifies, as well, the five parts or canons: invention,
disposition, elocution, memory, and delivery. But while he emphasizes invention and the
important role of the proofs and the topics (finding-places for arguments) for investigating
arguments, he suggests, nevertheless, that rhetoric is somewhat limited in that it serves as
an art of communication more than for the discovery of new truth (Enos 59; Kennedy,
ClassicalRhetoric 65). For Aristotle, scientific demonstration, reasoning from
scientifically true premises where the objective is to know and to discover what is
necessarily true, is superior both to rhetoric and dialectic. According to Aristotle, only
scientific demonstration arrives at true knowledge. Rhetoric works in the realm of human
experience to acquireprobabletruthinmatters where trueknowledge is unavailable (Bizzell
and Herzberg 144).
TheRoman orators Cicero andQuintilian further developed andperfected thebasic
principles of classical Greek rhetoric assetforth in the Aristotelian tradition, including the
division of rhetoric into tiie five partsor canons. (Thonssen andBaird 178). So too, both
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Cicero and Quintilian took up the dispute between rhetoric and dialectic, as the relationship
between the two disciplines continued to be regarded as problematic (Kennedy, Classical
Rhetoric 89). Cicero in his De Oratore reproves Socrates for scorning the practice of
oratory and regards the severance of oratory from philosophy as "absurd and unprofitable
and reprehensible" (247) because, he suggests, there is no distinction between learning to
know and learning to speak, between "res" and "verba," thinking and speaking (Ijsseling
35). Cicero's ideal, then, was to bring together eloquence and wisdom and to unite the
orator with the philosopher. The ideal orator is, as Cicero advocates, an orator who can
speak with fullness and variety and is knowledgeable of all important subjects and arts,
appears, as well, in Quintilian's definition of the orator as "the good man skilled in
speaking." For Quintilian the orator is far superior to the philosopher because the orator
must not only have perfect knowledge of philosophy, but also possess wisdom and a
facility for the art of speaking (Kennedy, Quintilian34). Quintilian asserts that those
philosophers who despise rhetoric are "simply idle and conceited" and claims that while
philosophycan easily be feigned, eloquence cannotbe (qtd. in Ijsseling39). Quintilian,
finally, suggests that thepursuitof tmth is bestdirected bypersuasive eloquence than by
philosophical method.
The medieval conceptof rhetoric departed significantly fromclassical systems as
the disappearance of muchof GreekandRoman learning and theChristian transformation
of its existent fragments increasingly confined rhetoric to a position subordinate to dialectic
(Bizzell andHerzberg 367). Thework of Boethius, then, was important for preserving
what Greco-Roman learning it did. Boethius thus hada profound influence upon the
conception ofmedieval rhetoric as heattempted to explicate andcompare the theories of
topical invention in thesystems ofAristotle and Cicero. Boethius takes upashisexplicit
goalan analysis of thedifferences between rhetorical anddialectical topoi and thus between
the arts of rhetoric and dialectic themselves. He asserts that both rhetoric and dialectic use
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essentially the same topoi, but concludes, then, that the differences betweenrhetoric and
dialecticconcem subjectmatter (Leff 14). Whiledialectic dealswith the thesis, a general
question with no reference to particular circumstances, rhetoric takes as its subject the
hypothesis, a questionconcernedwith specific circumstances. Boethius concludes thus
that rhetoricderives its arguments frompropositions provided by dialectic. This
conclusion effectively subordinatesrhetoric to dialectic, the topics of which are broader
thanandprior to rhetorical argumentation (Leff14), anddenies to rhetoric anyforce itself
for generating knowledge.
Finally, as the relativepositions of rhetoric anddialectic continued to be subjectto
inquiry under Ramus' program for reformduring the Renaissance,dialectic became
increasingly dominant and rhetoric was increasingly subordinated, pursued selectively and
regarded merely as a preliminary and prepatorysubject. Ramus' system of rhetoric and
dialectic, which became very popular in England between 1574 and 1620 and was thus
very influential in shaping schools of thoughtduringBacon's lifetime, was particularly
dramatic in the severing of rhetoric from dialectic (Howell, "Renaissance Rhetoric" 294;
Walton 294). Ramus constmcted his conception of rhetoric with the explicit goal of
distinguishing it from dialectic. He noted that the relationship between rhetoric and
dialectic had been unfortunately intertwined at least since the sophistic movement and
asserted that the two disciplines must be finally and fully separated from one another (Ong
226). And he proceeded to meet his goal by rearranging the traditional five parts of rhetoric
so that the activities of invention and arrangement were given over completely to dialectic.
He left rhetoric, then, only with elocution and deUvery aiid thus reduced it merely to
concems with stylistic ornamentation, isolated it from any means of invention, and drained
it of any power to generate knowledge.
The traces of the very tenuous relationship between rhetoric and invention described
here present only a notional reconstruction, one that is fragmented and open to
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interpretation. Certainlymuch more can and has been said on the subject. But while a
comprehensive historical accountof rhetorical theory is impossible in lightof time and
space, the survey of theories thus cited serves to point out the sharp distinctions among
differing positions acrossmanycenturies concerning the nature of the relationship between
rhetoric and invention. The conception of themerits and/orthe limitations of rhetoric
certainly affected its placement in the hierarchyof arts and theoriesof knowledge with
which classical, medieval, and Renaissance scholars alike were concerned. Bacon, in
undertaking a surveyof all the branches of knowledge, was certainlyaware that the
treatmentof the relationship betweenrhetoric and inventionwas one focal point reflecting
differences between schools of thought.
The scholarship fairly consistently agrees with Howell and cites Book n of the
Advancementto support their assertions that Baconworks in the rhetorical tradition to
further diminish the importance of rhetorical invention for the advancement of learning and
advances instead a new method of observation and experimentation (Briggs 151; Howell,
"Renaissance Rhetoric" 293; Howell, Logic andRhetoric. 371; Jardine 216; Stephens 69;
Wallace, "Bacon's Conception" 128;Wallace, Francis Bacon 61). Certainly, when
considering Bacon's comments on the nature of invention, there is a trend in the
scholarship to read Bacon's theory of rhetoric as one that devalues rhetoric's importance
for the progress of knowledge. Lisa Jardine argues that Bacon distinguishes vigorously
between "discovery," the investigation of new knowledge by way of the new logic, and
rhetorical "invention," the presentation of received assumptions or an already existent body
of knowledge for argument or display (6). And she goes as far as to assert that Bacon is so
preoccupied with discovery as the primary mode of human experience that he finds
rhetoric, as a study of the presentation or transmission of the known and accessible, to be
merely a social and conventional art, and in the last resort a parasitic activity (170). James
Stephens concludes too that rhetorical invention is for Baconmerely an act of recollection~
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the art of invention is to draw out of our stocks of knowledge whatever serves the
occasion, but has nothing to do with the discovery of such knowledge (69). And Karl A.
Wallace finds similarly that in Bacon's mind, rhetoric is an inferior science because it must
rely upon received philosophies as subjects of discourse (61).
Francis Bacon's Advancement and a New Rhetoric
I would argue that Bacon does mark a significant departure from previous theories
of rhetoric. But I don't agree with much of the scholarship that finds Bacon to contribute
to the diminution of rhetoric by treating it as an inferior subject. In fact, I would argue that
Bacon's new conception of rhetoric in terms of its psychological function returns rhetoric
to the center of the process of invention and discovery. In order to evaluate Bacon's own
assessment of the place of rhetoric and the role of invention in his design for the
advancement of knowledge it is necessary now to move even further to examine his
definition of rhetoric and its placement within his conceptionof faculty psychology. As
Bacon moves to consider the fourth art, that of "tradition," elocution or the transmission of
knowledge, he identifies three parts: the organ of tradition, the method of tradition, and the
illustration of tradition. And he here comes to treat the third division, the illustration of
tradition, or rhetoric - a science, he says, that is "excellent, and excellently well laboured"
{AdvancementII139). It is here that Bacon states his conception of rhetoric's work in
terms of its relation to specific human faculties: "the duty andofficeof rhetoric is to apply
reason to the imagination for the bettermovingof the will" {Advancement II139). Because
the faculty psychology that informs Bacon's definition of rhetoric is also at the foundation
ofhis entire system, it is important to consider rhetoric's function in terms of its relation to
the faculties of reason and imagination.
The same scholarship cited earlier, when it turns from Bacon's comments about
invention toward an interpretation of his definition of rhetoric, "to apply Reason to the
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Imagination for the bettermoving of the Will" and notes the place ofrhetoric at the center
of Bacon's faculty psychology, seems todraw very different conclusions. Jardine, for
example, evidently, does not recognize the important implications ofher further assertion
that inBacon's psychology as"logic presents arguments in such a form that reason gives
its assentto the conclusions^ so rhetoric presents theconclusions of the author's reason in
vivid images, whose persuasive force produces assent to theproposition, and movement
towards thedesired goal" (219). It would seem that, assuch, thepower of rhetoric to
influence action would work to faciUtatefurther scientific inquiry. Stephens notes, as well,
thatthewilland theappetite convert knowledge into action and suggests that"[o]nce
information is discovered by the senses andjudged byreason, it is thereceiver's option to
actbybelieving it, using it to inquire for new discoveries, oreven where truth is presented,
byrejecting it" (65). Theimplication here is that rhetoric works inBacon's faculty
psychology with the imagination toexcite the will of the inquirer toperform additional
inquiry andexperiment andfurther evaluation and criticism in thecontinued advancement
of knowledge. In fact,Wallace argues that"withoutthe aid of imagination, humanreason
cannot operate and thehuman will cannot determine upon a line of action" (38). Andhe
suggests thatas Baconunderstands rhetoric to influence action, the endof rhetoric for the
scientist is evaluation and criticism (29).
The significance of rhetorical activity forBacon's system is even more considerable
whenwe come toMarcCogan's attempt to locate andto evaluate the importof rhetoric's
actionwithin Bacon's philosophical system. Cogannotes that all intellectual operationsof
judgment within Bacon's system are carriedout either by the faculty of reason or the
faculty of will: all speculativethought and rationaldetermination of what constitutes the
better course of action fall into the province of the reason and every choice as to the actual
action to be pursued is the subject of the will (214). Cogan argues that the explicit function
ofrhetoric works even within the individual toward "the translation of one's reason to
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one's own imagination for the purpose of assuming rational control of one's own actions"
(223), and he states that according to Bacon's system, an individual who does not possess
rhetorical skills remains unable to capitalize on the results of thinking in the realm of action.
He concludes that
by defining for rhetoric this inward function and moment, Bacon gives an
explicitly rhetorical dimension to the understanding of action. By making
control of the imagination (and through it the will) a procedure of which the
unaided speculative reason is incapable, and which requires, therefore, the
special powers rhetoric provides, Bacon makes all action, individual as well
as corporate, depend on the knowledge and use of rhetoric " (224)
It can be argued, then, that rhetoric stands at the center of human activity ~ either
speculativeor practical —and wields an inescapable influenceover both thought and action
(216). Coganexplores the implications of this importfor morahtyand ethics in Bacon's
system, but offers little in context of Bacon's scientific method.
David Payne articulates a fairly standardpositionin diminishing the import of
rhetoric's psychological function when he suggests that although rhetoric serves an
important function within Bacon's faculty psychology, its primary role is neither to invent
nor to judge, but to "illustrate" (253). He argues that the key word for Bacon is "tradition"
and notes that Bacon viewed knowledge arrivedat throughoral discourse as a matter of
tradition and thus part of the past. This role, Payne notes, is different from that with which
rhetoric wascredited in classical times, andheargues that"[a]llof theevidence and
commentary on Bacon should help to advance one conclusion" (248) - that is, that Bacon
saw the role of rhetoric in a way that "places him in line with the consistentdecline of
rhetoric which began in themiddle ages and continued through theageof romanticism"
(253). Although at first glance it would seem thatPayne is right to assert thatall the
commentary agrees upon a standard interpretationof Bacon's theory of rhetoric, I would
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argue, however, thatupon closer examination theevidence, rather than advancing only one
conclusion, produces several different interpretations as toBacon's rhetorical theory. I
wouldpoint to James P. Zappenwho, in fact, recognizes that various historians have
supported a number ofdifferent, often incompatible and even conflicting arguments
regarding Baconand hisviewof rhetoric andthat these differences are "bothhistorical and
historiographic" (74). And I would agree, thus,with SharonCrowleywho asserts that
concerning historiography or the doingof history, "there exists no objectivemeansof
finding, interpreting, or assembhng historical datawhich couldguarantee the truthof the
resulting narrative" (7).
The follovwng paper intends, then, to explore the conflicting, contradictory
interpretations of the placeof rhetorical invention in Bacon's scientific method. The paper
will argue that if we consider the following threepoints, wewill come to the conclusion
that science and rhetoric are much closer related in Bacon's system than has previously
been allowed: 1) Bacon's Advancement attacks all traditional learning, including
traditional rhetoric, to make way for his plan for reform; 2) Bacon's new science is one
that condemns the pursuit of experimentsfor speculation only and advocates the active use
of results; and 3) Bacon's new rhetoric is required in his system of faculty psychology
before any deliberative action can take place. The paper will argue that Bacon posits a
redefinition ofrhetoric that links it both to reason and the imagination and makes it a
prerequisite for action ~ including continued scientific inquiry and experiment. It will
support an alternative interpretation that finds Bacon to allow a more active role for rhetoric
in his new method of inquiry and invention than has previously been recognized. And it
will, finally, set forth an interpretation that instead of placing Bacon in line in advancing the
diminution of rhetoric, in fact, sees him as advancing rhetoric by emphasizing its proper
function at the center of scientific invention and progress.
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CHAPTER 1. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The proliferation of scholarship concerning Bacon's work, in light of the variety
and the complexity of his achievements,precludesany comprehensiveendeavor to
synthesize the research. My focus in this chapter, instead, will be to provide a reasonably
complete review of the literature that attends to Bacon's conceptionof rhetoric and to
consider those particular specializedstudies that deal directlywithBacon's theoryof
rhetoric. My framingconcernwill be with the assertion madefairly consistently in the
scholarship that stresses the inferiorposition rhetoric holds in Bacon's system, particularly
for invention and in comparison to scientific investigation.
General texts in the history of rhetoric tend to give very little space to Bacon's
theory of rhetoric. When they do turn to his theory, they tend to stress that while Bacon
considers rhetoric an important art for influencingaction, he neverthelessdistances rhetoric
from the invention of knowledge. In their textTheRhetorical Tradition: Readingsfrom the
Classical Times to the Present^ Bizzell and Herzberg state, for instance, that Bacon
distinguishes between the nature of invention as it applies to science, where it works
toward the invention of something new, and as it is used in rhetoric, where it is concerned
with the recollection of knowledge ah-eadyproduced by science. They point out, then, that
Bacon regards science as the invention of new knowledge and rhetoric as the means by
which knowledge is used in social concerns, particularly as it recommends moral, ethical
behavior (624). In Rhetoric in the European Tradition, Thomas Conley suggests further
that Bacon "radically devalued" rhetoric as it pertains to invention (164). He states that
Bacon conceives of invention as the process by which new knowledge is discovered by
way ofexperimentation, and he goes on to say that Bacon believes rhetoric, the discovery
of arguments, must be "expelled from schoolsof serious thought about the real world"
(167).
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The Authority of Karl Wallace
Certainly, there is a trend in the scholarship to read Bacon's theory of rhetoric as
one that devalues rhetoric's importance for the progress of knowledge. I believe that we
might gain some insight into this trend if we consider the authority with which Karl
Wallace speaks on the subject. Wallace's Francis Bacon on Communication & Rhetoric,
or: The Art ofApplying Reason to the Imaginationfor the BetterMoving of the Will
published in 1943 provides to date what is widely recognized as the most comprehensive
comment on Bacon's theory of rhetoric as it is worked out in iht Advancement. Any
interest in Bacon's new science and the connection (or lack thereof) with rhetoric must refer
to his text, which provides what William A. Sessions describes as "the most prolific
commentary" and thus also, perhaps, the most authoritative commentary on Bacon's
rhetorical theory (359). Wallace's stated intention here is twofold: first to set forth
Bacon's theory of rhetoric as it appears in The Advancement ofLearning and its expanded
Latin translation, De Augmentis Scientiarum^ and then to construct an evaluation and an
appraisal of the contributions that Bacon's theory provides. Wallace says that Bacon
advocates a clear distinction between science and rhetoric. He argues that Bacon
distinguishes rhetorical invention from scientificinquiry, and he says that becauseBacon
limits rhetoric to popular opinion and to the affairs of the multitude, he finds it inferior to
science (49).
Wallace begins with an attempt to set forth Bacon's classification ofknowledge and
to identify the position within this hierarchy given to rhetoric. It is here that Wallace finds
Bacon to distinguish between the kind of discourse used when engaging in scientific and/or
didactic communication and the kind of discourseused when intending to influence action.
Wallace asserts that Bacon intends to distinguish in his system the Method of Discourse, or
disposition, from the Illustration of Discourse, or rhetoric. Bacon removes the method of
discourse from its traditional place underrhetoric andassigns it the statusof a separate art
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in its own right. He then distinguishes between different kinds of methods, first between
theMagistral and theInitiative, according to theendsatwhich eachaims (18). The
Magistral method assumes a popular audience andaims to instruct in the useof knowledge
already discovered. The Initiative method assumes an audience of critical learners, the
"sons of science," and aims to communicate knowledge as it was discovered so as to
further its progression (18). According toWallace, theMethod of Discourse distinguishes
didactic communication from scientific discourse and works, as well, to distinguish both of
these from the Illustration ofDiscourse, or rhetorical address. Wallace suggests here that
Bacon does not intend to include rhetoric in scientific discourse and proceeds to argue that
Bacon distinguishes rhetorical invention from scientific inquiry.
Wallace goes on, then, to note thatBacondifferentiates betweentwo kinds of
invention, one concerning the sciences and the other concerning speech and arguments.
Wallaceexplains, citingBacon, thatwhilethefirst typemight appropriately be considered
invention because it works to discover what we do not already know, the second type of
invention cannot rightfully be called inventionbecause it does nothingmore than to discem
the best use of our present knowledge to discoverand produce arguments applicable to the
subjectat hand. He quotes heavily from the second bookof Bacon's Advancement to
support his conclusion that Bacon regards rhetorical invention as a process merely to draw
forth material from our storehouse of knowledge and not as the discovery or advancement
of new knowledge (55). Wallace goes as far as to argue that because rhetoric relies upon
received knowledge and is concerned with popular discourse, it "finds precise, scientific
knowledge of littie use" and concludes:
Thus it is clear that rhetoric relies on popular truth ratiier than on scientific
truth. The arguments employed in rhetorical address will be drawn from
popular opinion, will utilize a method ofdisposition appropriate to this level
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of truth and to their persuasive function, and finally will be expressed and
delivered in a manner consonant with their social function. (48)
As such, Wallace finds rhetoric in Bacon's view and his system to rank far below science.
However, it is important to note here that Wallace does not proceed to suggest that
Bacon leaves rhetoric an empty art, with concerns only of style or ornamentation. In fact,
while Wallace notes the temptation to interpret Bacon's conception of rhetoric in such a
way, he asserts that a more accurate perspective will find Bacon to place great emphasis on
invention, on the selection of arguments and ideas with reference to a specific situation and
given audience. The specific function of rhetoric in Bacon's system is to choose from
among appropriate arguments to persuade popular opinion as to influence right action in
matters only of ethical or moral concerns. Wallace asserts that rhetoric is an art of public
discourse, as it rules in popular affairs to influence right conduct.
Wallace cites Bacon's deflnition of rhetoric, "The duty and office of Rhetoric is to
apply Reason to Imagination for the better moving of the will," to argue that the special
province of rhetoric is its power to influence action. In Bacon's system of faculty
psychology, the will is the agent responsible for inciting voluntary, deliberative action.
And rhetoric is the only art which employs the imagination on behalf of the reason to
influence the will. Wallace argues that "without the aid of imagination,human reason
cannot operate and the human will cannot determine upon a line of action" (38). It would
seem that such an interpretationwould promptWallace to suggest, then, that rhetoric is
integral to Bacon's scheme for the advancement of learningbecause the end of rhetoric for
the scientist is to rouse the imagination to action, to evaluate andcriticize and then acceptor
reject new knowledge (34), Wallace seems, though, not to consider the ramifications of
his interpretation andproceeds insteadagain to undermine the importance of rhetoric in
Bacon's scientificmethod as he later says that the function of rhetoric is limited in Bacon's
systemto persuadingpopular opinionso as to influence right actionin mattersonly of
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ethicalor moral concerns (40). Wallacecontinues to arguethatBaconconceives of
rhetoric, by virtue of itsparticular function ofexciting the will, asessentially social, as
reserved for the levelof popularknowledge andforestablishing thejust andgoodcause.
Finally, then, Wallace turns to evaluate Bacon's rhetorical theory, and he finds that
Bacon'smost significant contribution is his assertion thatrhetoric works as a complete,
full-bodied, independent art. Heconcludes that because Bacon recommends forrhetoric its
own province - toimpel right action - Bacon "has helped tomaintain the dignity and
solidity ofrhetoric" (225). And heargues that because Bacon subordinates concerns of
style to theinvention ofarguments, because he emphasizes the importance of content and
reasoned argument rather than figurative dress and stylistics, hemaintains a classical view
of rhetoric, one that regards rhetoric as a legitimateand distinct activity,
Wallace's later work- his 1956article "Aspects ofModemRhetoricin Francis
Bacon"andhis 1961 essay "Bacon's Conception ofRhetoric" -continues to reflect his
argument thatrhetoric is notengaged in scientific communication butis, rather, an artof
public discourse, as itmles inpopular affairs toinfluence right conduct (405). In fact, he
argues in his"Bacon'sConception ofRhetoric" even more explicitiy thatBacon conceives
of rhetoric, by virtue of its particular function of exciting thewill, as essentially social, as
reservedfor the level of popularknowledge (138). Wallacenotes here the function of
rhetoric to recommend reason to the imagination and notes, as well, the special function of
theimagination as it works toward thegoals of science in thediscovery of knowledge and
towards the end of ethics in the discovery of right action. Nevertheless, Wallace finds that
in Bacon's view, the faculties are employed either as instruments of knowing or as means
of action, and he moves thus to assert that Bacon limits the end of rhetorical discourse to its
ethical function to recommend conduct that is virtuous and good (118). Wallace again
notes that Bacon distinguishes rhetorical invention from scientific inquiry and evaluates
rhetoric separately from the science which discovers new knowledge.
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General Trends and Specific Conflicts
I think it's important to recognize, now, that Wallace is careful in his interpretation
ofBacon's rhetorical theory and his evaluation of Bacon's contribution both to set forth
what it is that separates rhetoric from the new science and to look deeply into what it is that
legitimizes the office of rhetoric as an independent art. Wallace's dual intentions here
identified ~ to stake out a legitimate place for rhetoric by distinguishing rhetoric from
science and by emphasizing rhetoric's own special province - preview, then, what many
have come to see as the standard interpretation in Baconian scholarship. This standard
interpretation tends 1) to see rhetoric removed entirelyfrom Bacon's methodfor the
invention ofnew knowledge and thus devalued in his overall plan, and 2) to consider
rhetoric's position in Bacon's system as important only for moral instruction and civic
affairs. David Payne goes as far as to assert that "[a]ll of the evidence and commentary oh
Bacon should help to advance one conclusion: Bacon represents a tuming point in not only
rhetorical theory, but an entire tradition of thought about knowledge in the methods of its
acquisition and transmission" (248). He proceeds to explain that the research and
interpretation finds the new modern tradition for which Bacon is known one in which the
advancement of knowledgedependsnot on invention in rhetoric, but on discovery by way
of scientific investigation. And while the scholarship finds rhetoric's function to be
important, it notes rhetoric's limited role to illustrateknowledgealready discovered so as to
influence the proper action of the public (248).
I would suggest that there are twoproblems with settingforth such an interpretation
as "standard." I would argue first that the scholarship which does articulate this
interpretation fails to recognize the import of rhetoric's psychological function for
invention, and as such it fails too tonote rhetoric's import forBacon's overall plan for the
advancement of learning. Andsecondly I would argue that while the temptation is there to
read the scholarship as advancing one coherent and standard interprctation - infact, upon
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closer examination, much of the scholarship, rather than advancing only one conclusion,
produces several different interpretations astoBacon's rhetorical theory, some ofwhich
overlap, others ofwhich take opposing views, and allofwhich offer only partial images.
Certainly, when considering Bacon's comments on thenature of invention, the
trend is to read Bacon's theoryof rhetoric as one thatdevalues rhetoric's importfor the
progression ofknowledge. However, even when the scholarship for themost part shares
with Wallace theassumption thatBacon distinguishes between andprivileges invention in a
new scientific method over invention in rhetoric, it fails to come to any agreement or
support any oneconclusion as to thescope ofrhetoric's function within Bacon'slarger
plan for the advancement of learning. When turning toBacon's definition ofrhetoric in
terms of his system of faculty psychology, for instance, the trend is to readBacon's theory
of rhetoric as one that conceives of rhetoric as providing a necessary servicein the
continued advancement of learning. The following review enumerates the various stances
bywhich scholars haveunderstood andevaluated Bacon'sconception of rhetoric. The
firamework constructedhere approaches the scholarship as it tends either 1) to emphasize
rhetoric's position asinferior to science and thus toevaluate rhetoric's position inBacon's
system fairlyharshly, or 2) to acknowledge rhetoric's inferior position but to emphasize its
special province and thus to allow a limited butkinder evaluation.
Rhetoric as a "Second-Class" Art
Of those works that find Bacon to diminish the value of rhetoric, Lisa Jardine's
(1974) Francis Bacon: Discovery and theArt ofDiscourse proceeds to evaluate perhaps
most harshlyrhetoric's placewithinBacon's philosophical system. Her study, as the title
suggests, stresses the distinction concerning "invention" that Baconmakes between
discovery, the investigation of new knowledge by way of a new logic, and the art of
discourse, the selection and arrangement of received knowledge for the purpose of
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argument ordisplay. Jardine asserts that Bacon finds rhetoric tobeconcerned with opinion
and persuasion and sodeems it a social and conventional art, unsuitable for producing truth
in areas of''real" knowledge (170), Andshe goes as faras to saythatBacon sees rhetoric
as a "second-class" study andin thelastresort asa "parasitic" activity (170). Jardine does
recognize that Bacon defines thefunction ofrhetoric as applying reason to the imagination
to excite the will and asserts that "[a]s logic presentsarguments in such a form that reason
gives its assent to the conclusions, sorhetoric presents the conclusions of theauthor's
reasonin vivid images, whose persuasive force produces assent to the proposition, and
movement towards the desired goal" (219). Jardine recognizes the import of the
imaginative faculty in acting as amediator between rational evaluation and thewill toact,
though sheevidentiy resists thefurther implications of her assertion. It would seem that
thepower of rhetoric to influence action would work tofacilitate further scientific inquiry.
But she, too, limits the office of this mediatingfunction to ethical and emotional concerns
(91). And she concludes, fmally, that for Bacon, rhetoric is essentially ornamentation
(216).
Charles Whimey (1986), as well, finds Bacon to severely Hmit and thusdevalue tiie
province of rhetoric. He attempts inFrancisBacon andModernity, to examine what he
finds to be Bacon's characteristically modem project, a project that, Whitney argues,
consists of tensions between old and new, tradition and revolution. Whitney approaches
Bacon's conception of rhetoric from these tensions andargues thatBacondenies to rhetoric
the investigative power it had once claimed andreapplies thatpower to sciencein the search
for truth (10). Whitney suggests Bacon's convictionsas to the proper relation of rhetoric
to the discovery of truth emerge from the discontinuity between Bacon's dependence on
rhetorical traditions and his commitment to a revolutionary new process of discovery.
Whitney goes on to emphasize that Bacondesignatespopular discourse as the appropriate
field of rhetoric (147). Unfortunately, in noting rhetoric's function in Bacon's system as a
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psychological tool for swaying public opinion soas to gain acceptance for science,
Whitney concludes that Bacon limits the realms of the imagination and rhetoric merely to
instrumental functions and thus "renders them impotentin the larger human endeavor of
discovery" (148).
Rhetoric as a "Limited but Essential" Art
Most scholars of Baconagreethatrhetoric is a hmitedbut essential art and tend to
emphasize that Baconremovesrhetoric from anyparticipation in the invention of new
knowledge. A numberof these scholars, however, follow a second basic trendin
recognizing also thatBacon nevertheless maintains for rhetoric an important position in his
philosophy. Again, evenwithin whatI have identified as this second trend in Baconian
scholarship there emerges various interpretations as to theposition thatrhetoric occupies in
Bacon's philosophy. David Faldet (1990) andPaoloRossi (1968) emphasizerhetoric's
function as it works in areas of moral and civic concern. Faldet states in "Of Readiness and
Rhetoric in Advancement ofLearning*' that as rhetoric carries out a necessary
socialfunction, it occupies a "limitedbut essential" place in Bacon's plan for new learning
(30). Faldet, too, notes that Bacon distinguishesbetween the canon of invention in rhetoric
from invention in science and then rejects the overextension of the rhetorical concept of
invention into areas of scientific experimentation. He says that Bacon warns, in fact, that
suchoverextension prevents the searchfor newknowledge in the advancement of learning.
Bacon prefers that the term "invention" be preservedfor the new scientificmethod (31).
Faldet finds that Bacon thus defines rhetoric's place to be in the communication and use of
remembered knowledge in the conduct of human affairs and concludes, then, that Bacon's
interest in rhetoric is aimed at its influence in moral and civic affairs (29).
In Francis Bacon: FromMagic to Science Paolo Rossi also stresses that Bacon
distinguishes between invention in science, which is to invent or discover what we do not
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know, and the invention of arguments, which is only to select what is pertinent from
knowledge already discovered. He finds, then, that rhetorical invention in Bacon's scheme
assists knowledge but does not work to extend it (153). Rossi then notes Bacon's
definition of rhetoric as applying reason to the imagination to better move the will and says
that by this Bacon means to grant rhetoric the power to influence action. He goes as far as
to suggest that within Bacon's scheme of psychology, all action is preceded and motivated
by the imagination. He, too, however, turns then to limit rhetoric to moral concerns by
asserting that for Bacon the art of rhetoric belongs to the sphere of ethics and influences
moral actions (185).
Rhetoric as a Moral and Civil Art
While Faldet and Rossi tend to emphasize the limits of rhetoric's function, other
scholars tend to emphasize the importance of rhetoric's explicit function to influence action.
Jerry Weinberger (1985), in his commentary on Bacon's Advancement ofLearning:
Science, Faith, and Politics: FrancisBacon and the UtopianRoots of theModernAge,
finds too that for the sakeof practice in moralandcivicmatters and in regard to popular
opinion, Baconasserts the superiority of rhetoric. He emphasizes thatBacon's principle
task is to describe the arts and sciences as theymust be pursuedfor the furthermost end of
knowledge in thepractical life - that is, the unity of theory and practice, ofcontemplation
andaction (229). Andhe argues that since theend of the new method is unity in theory
andpractice in the"activelife,"Bacon intends rhetoric to bean all-knowing art of arts
(275).
Cogan (1981) also is concerned with the special powers of rhetoric tomake action
possible. His "Rhetoric and Action in Francis Bacon" provides a very illuminating
interpretation ofBacon's faculty psychology and the "explicitly rhetorical dimension" of
action in bothpersonal andpublic affairs. He notes, too, thatBacon describes rhetoric in
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terms of the human faculties and explains that "of the rational arts of communication, only
rhetoric addresses the imagination; of the arts that address the imagination, only rhetoric is
informed by reason, and only it has as its end the rational management of action" (219).
While other arts of communication are concemed with thought and speculation, rhetoric is
designed to influence action, Cogan asserts, then, that this special function in the process
of action might be understood as "translative" in that it translates the conclusions the reason
has drawn into a form acceptable to the imagination so as to influence or initiate action
(221). And he suggests rightly that this function becomes even more vital in considering
Bacon's notions as to the field of rhetoric's operation.
Cogan here too argues that while the natural field for rhetoric is the persuasion of
others in the public domain, the description of the role rhetoric plays in terms of the
faculties suggests another field for rhetoric in the case of the individual. He asserts that
Bacon never restricts his statements concerning rhetoric's translative role to the translation
of conclusions from one person's reason to another's and that, in fact, Bacon intends
rhetoric to work on the individual level (223). Cogan argues that for Bacon, "the first and
most important translation of reason to imagination must occur in the individual; and this
means that in some sense the first and most important field of operation for rhetoric is
intemal and personal, rather than public" (223). He concludes, then, that Bacon finds the
use of rhetoric to be necessary if action, both personal and public, is to be rational and
moral and goes on to say that an individualwhodoes not possess rhetorical skill will
remaina "kind of intellectual paraplegic, able to thinkbut unable to capitalize on theresults
of this thinking in therealmof personal conduct" (225). But ratherthan examining the
implications for scientific inquiry of thespecial linkbetween rhetoric andaction, Cogan
limitshis observations to the implications formoralinstmction and general ethical
understanding.
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Rhetoric as a Popular Art
A number of those scholars, like Cogan, who emphasize the importance ofBacon's
new definition of rhetoric in terms of faculty psychology are also concerned with the
specific value of Bacon's new theory of rhetorical style for delivering to the populace the
results of scientific investigation. In "Francis Bacon and the Historiography of Scientific
Rhetoric," James P. Zappen (1989) is concerned with Bacon's theory of style particularly
as it affects scientific rhetoric. He asserts that Bacon arranges several methods of
presentation as follows: the magistral and exoteric methods and "Methods" are designed
for the use of knowledge by the public, and the initiative and acroamatic methods and
aphorisms are designed for the progression of knowledge by those who Bacon labels the
"sons.. .of science" (81). And he notes that Bacon also provides at least two styles, the
imaginative and the plain style, each of which addresses different faculties and is thus
suitable for serving different purposes and addressing different audiences in different parts
of his scientific method.
James Stephens (1975) too devotes his study to Bacon's plan for the delivery or
transmission of discoveries made by way of the new science. Stephens' Francis Bacon
and the Style ofScience discusses Bacon's conception of discourse in general and of the
rhetorical tradition and explicatesBacon's new theoryof communication, a style of
presentation that he believedshouldprevailamong scholars, Stephens says thatBacon
found the traditional rhetoric to encourageand cater to the weaknessesof the mind. The
traditional system of rhetorical invention, then, is shifted byBacon to theinvention merely
of speech andarguments, anactof remembrance, ofrecollection ofwhat has already been
obtained. While Stephens emphasizes here that Bacon finds rhetoric tobeapopular art and
to handle reason as it is planted in theopinions of thevulgar (35), he latermoves to find
Bacon's definition ofrhetoric in terms of the faculties tobeilluminating and even says that
science and rhetoric are united in the psychology ofdiscovery. He notes the power of
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rhetoric in relation to the imaginationand states thatBacon believes the imaginationcould
beprofitably exploited by the scientist for the translation of thenewscience to the"crowd
of learners" (35) and thus for further advancement of learning. He goes on, though, in
what seems like a conu^dictory suggestion to intimate that Bacon appoints an even more
importantrole for rhetoric in the scheme for reform bypointing to its holdover thewill:
"Man's will and appetite are the facultieswhichconverthis knowledge into fruitful action.
Once information is discovered by the senses and judged by reason, it is the receiver's
option to act by believing it, by using it to inquire for new discoveries, or, even where truth
is presented, by rejecting it" (65). And he points to the importance for the new science to
persuade even intellectuals- to stimulateinquiry,"to create inventors rather than scholars,
actors on rather than passive recipients of knowledge" (77).
Rhetoric as "Supreme Illustrator of Knowledge"
A small number of works assert further that even if rhetoric relies on received
knowledge, as Bacon's new plan for scientific inquiry depends upon rhetorical
communication between inquirers, rhetoric works as a tool to assist science by illustrating
the results of experimentation for both popular and learned audiences. John C. Briggs
(1989) in Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric ofNature is interested in Bacon's instruction for
the transmission of scientific discoveries. He argues that Bacon found traditional rhetoric
to function merely as a tool. And because Bacon found traditional rhetoric to recall
learning rather than discover it and thus to close inquiry prematurely, he believed rhetoric,
in fact, to corrupt the advancement of knowledge (151). Briggs states that Bacon's charges
against traditional rhetoric throw into question its usefulness for civil discourse and limits
its import for addressing popular audiences (155). He notes, then, that Bacon responds to
the defects in traditional rhetoric by reconceiving it in such a way as to allow its
incorporation into the new philosophy. Briggs findsBacon's argument that true scientific
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method should transmit theprocess of scientific invention in thesame way it was invented
to be, in fact, a variation upon rhetoric^s useof the imagination for thecause of reason
(31). He finds Bacon to discard theoldrhetoric and fashion a new thatbyway of the
aphoristic method stimulates scientific activity. It isquestionable, however, whether Bacon
sets forth theaphoristic method as rhetorical activity. In fact, asWallace asserts, Bacon
seems to distinguish verycarefully between theMethod ofDiscourse, which would include
theaphoristic method, and the Illustration ofDiscourse, orrhetorical address. Finally,
then, it is also questionable whether Briggs's conclusion thatBacon'snew rhetoric is a
scientific rhetoric that arises firom the principles of the newscienceand is "as rhetorical as it
is scientific" (214) is a dependable one.
Zappen, however, notes thatBacon divides the transfer of knowledge intothe
organ of tradition, themethod of tradition (which is a part of logic), and the illustration of
tradition (orrhetoric). And he proceeds to note thatBacon seemsto intend logic to be
directed toward science and rhetoric to be directed toward popular opinion. But he rightiy
notes that the distinction is not so simple and that the exact relationship between the two
arts is left unclear (246). He goes on to argue that Bacon, in his discussion of method,
distinguishes among several kinds of method to beused based on the given subject,
audience, andpurpose and that as such, as logicis concerned with audience, it seems to be
concernedwith both learned and popularaudiences (246). Zappen, however, argues in
"Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Science" (1975) that the most important implication that
might be drawnfromBacon's theoryof communication is that the transferof knowledge
relies on both logic and rhetoric. Zappen points to Bacon's own insistence to argue that the
divisions among the branches of knowledge shouldnot be applied too strictly. He, then,
asserts further that Bacon's principleof the unity of knowledge "suggests that logic is the
proper realm of the rhetorician" (246). And he concludes, though only briefly, that
"Bacon's theories about discourse suggest the possibilityof an alliance between inquiry
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andexpression" (247). Although Zappen does notpursue theramifications of such an
observation, I believe hispoint raises issues here thatare, at leastpartly, at stakeinmy
own inquiry.
Howell observes thatone important characteristic of theories of rhetoric duringthe
Renaissance concerns invention and the emphasisplacedon the distinctionbetween
invention in the scientific investigation of external realities and invention in rhetorical
discourse as themeans by which those realities ought to bestbepresented andused
("Renaissance Rhetoric" 303). In dealing specifically with Bacon's theory of rhetoric in a
chapter in hisLogic andRhetoric inEngland, 1500-1700, Howell (1961) notes, aswell,
that Bacon distinguishesbetween two kinds of invention, but he does not suggest, then,
thatBacon limits rhetoric to thepopularaudience and topublicaffairs. Howellmoves to
the position in explicating Bacon's definition of rhetoric as applying reason to the
imagination for the bettermoving of thewill thatBacon means here to place rhetoric as an
alliance between reason and imagination so that reasonmight operate in the human life.
Howellpoints to Bacon's assumption that if the reasonprevailed, cold logicwouldbe
enough to persuade both the learned and thepopular audience as to the truth of propositions
andproofs. But, asHowell notes, Bacon, in fact, believes that the passions tend to be
unruly and disobedient to the reason so that even the learned tend toward unreason,
emotion, and prejudice. Bacon, then, does not limit rhetoric merely to discourse addressed
to the popular audience, but suggests thatrhetoric must necessarily addressitself to the
reason and the imagination in learned discourse, as well (373). Howell thus concludes that
one ofBacon's chief contributions to modem rhetoric is his "emphasis upon rhetoric as the
supreme illustrator of knowledge for any audience, learned or popular" (375).
B. M. G. Wormald (1993) attempts in his study, Francis Bacon: History, Politics
and Science, 1561-1626^ to reappraise Bacon's reputation in natural science as well as his
contributions to other fields. As he discusses Bacon's program, Wormald aptly stress that
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Bacon places rhetoric between logic and morality as participating inboth. And he
emphasizes the participation ofand the importance ofrhetoric in relation to Bacon's new
scientific method: rhetoric, like thecommon logic, "willassist bycommunicating notonly
instructions aboutitselfbut also theresults it may succeed in achieving" (86). Evenwhile
Wormald says that Bacon assigns torhetoric various limitations, he asserts, nevertheless,
that Bacon views rhetoric as wholly indispensable (86). He argues, in fact, that Bacon
finds rhetoric "rightly used, not separated from philosophy/science, but harnessed inunity
with it, makes and sustains society" (88).
MargaretL.Wiley (1971) inher article entitled "Francis Bacon: Induction and/or
Rhetoric" does much to further theargument that Bacon defines forrhetoric amore active
role inhis new program for the advancement oflearning. Wiley places the psychological
qualifications that Bacon sets forth for his ideal investigator at the center ofherargument
when she suggests that Bacon's inductive method and his rhetorical theory are closely
relatedin that the end of both is ultimately movement directed by right action. Wiley quotes
fromBacon's assertion, which states that thematterat hand is not merely speculation but
thereal business andpower of operation, to support herown argument thatboth his
inductivemethod and his rhetorical discourse beginby aiming at action (74). I agreewith
her suggestion that both Bacon's scientific method and his rhetoric make use ofhuman
imaginative capabilities and directive reasoning ability todirect action and thus further the
work of investigation (70), and also when she draws the important conclusion that themost
single common factor between Bacon's method and his rhetoric is that neither is aimed at




John C.Briggs states that"[t]hereading ofBaconian texts resembles theBaconian
reading of nature, for in both the interpreter must discover a clue to the labyrinth" (13).
Perhaps, then, asBriggs says, because Bacon at times doubles back, contradicts himself
and changes his way, and,as KarlWallace suggests, because the interpreter whopresents
Bacon's viewsmustconjecture to a greatextent, the reading of scholarship concerned with
Baconian texts also resembles the labyrinth, for the reader here too will encounter
doubleness. The doubleness I am identifyinglies in the attempts I find present in the
scholarship to locate and evaluate rhetoric's place withinBacon's philosophical system.
The scholarship, whennotingBacon's distinction between discovery in scienceand
invention in rhetoric and when turning to Bacon's definitionof rhetoric and noting its place
at the center of Bacon's facultypsychology, drawsvarious conclusions as to the
implications of such placement. The various conclusions that are drawn, then, giveway to
multipletensions- tension as to whetherrhetoric is an inferiorandparasitic activity or an
art central to Bacon's plan for the advancement of leaming, as to whether rhetoric
addresses learned audiences or is limited to popular audiences, as to whether rhetoric takes
part in furtheringscientific investigation or functions only in publicaffairsand concerns of
morality. Such tensions, I argue, as theybecome apparent in the literature, in their discord
will open a space for a renewed interpretation of Bacon's conception of rhetoric.
As the controversy remains in the scholarship as to whetherBacon finds rhetoric to
be impotent or at best a parasitic activity or defines it as absolutely indispensable as the
supreme illustrator of knowledge, there remains space in which Bacon's theory of rhetoric
is certainly open to interpretation. I believe that the literature, even when it more positively
acknowledges rhetoric's central position in Bacon's psychology and grants rhetoric an
essential position in Bacon's plan for the advancement of leaming, fails either to recognize
the very central position that rhetoric shares with scientific inquiry in Bacon's new method
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of invention or to setforth a comprehensive view of theimport ofrhetorical activity for
Bacon's new science. I would argue, in fact, that there is spaceeven in which to pose an
alternative interpretation ofBacon's theory ofrhetoric, one that positions rhetoric as much
more central to Bacon's new scientific method of invention than has been acknowledged by
any of theprevious scholarship. The remaining chapters will, then, proceed in such a
direction toexplore the fuller implications and greater importance ofrhetorical action within
Bacon's newmethod of inquiry andexperimentation in the continued advancement of
knowledge.
35
CHAPTER 11. REFUTATION AND REFORMATION
The aim of this study, in the remaining chapters, is to present an alternative
interpretation of theimportance of rhetorical action in Bacon's system. Thisinterpretation
will ensue from the theory of communication setforth inThe Advancement ofLearning and
from the faculty psychology thatemerges from Bacon'swork. The plan for thischapteris
twofold. First, this chapter will argue that it is necessary to read Bacon's complaints
against traditional rhetoric in context ofBacon'sattacks against allreceived traditions. The
chapter willmove first to outline themajor points in BookI ofTheAdvancement of
Learning that explicateBacon's opinions concerning received philosophies and in so doing
will illustrate that much of what the scholarship has cited as complaints that Baconmakes
againstrhetoric are, in fact, specific complaints against scholastic logic and humanist
rhetoric. Second, this chapter will proceed to articulate the ends at which Bacon's reform
of knowledge aims and will thus emphasizeBacon's plan for constructing a new live and
active science. I believe this effort will leave us in a position to find Bacon to allow for a
much more active role for rhetoric in his new method of inquiry and invention than has
previously been recognized.
Refutation of Received Philosonhies
Bacon's ideal objective, "the total reconstruction of the sciences, arts and all human
knowledge," begins with an explicit challenge to the authority of received philosophic
traditions. Bacon is concerned with the inadequacy in the seventeenth century of existing
knowledge and with the deficiencies that have prevented its advancement:
The subtiety of nature is greater many times over than the subtelty of the
senses and understanding; so that all those specious meditations,
speculations and glosses in which men indulge are quite from the purpose,
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only there is no one by to observe it. As the sciences we now have do not
help us in finding out new works, so neither does the logic which we now
have help us in finding out new sciences. The logic now in use serves
rather to fix and give stability to the errors which have their foundation in
commonly received notions than to help search after the truth. So it does
more harm than good, (^orks Vin 69)
In such terms Bacon thus attacks the authority of traditional learning, which he argues has
been accepted without scrutiny as true and which in its assumption that all knowledge has
been discovered inhibits the process of discovery. Bacon's inventory of learning, his
comments on its adequacies and inadequacies, and his method for the reform of knowledge
proceeds, then, with his review ofpast philosophers. In Book I of the Advancement,
Bacon takes up the task of surveying "what the particular acts and works are, which have
been embraced and undertakenfor the advancement of learning; and again what defects and
undervalues I find in such particular acts..." {Advancement 15). He treats all classical
philosophies with similar condemnation, as he cites as the greatest obstacle to the
advancement of learninga reverence for antiquity anda beliefthat all knowledge had
already beendiscovered. His primary objection is that all pastphilosophies relymoreon
intellectual contemplation thanon directobservation andexperimentation. In his attackhe
intends to make way for further discovery and invention.
Bacon's complaints against received traditions have been studied in detail.
Anderson has provided an important study of Bacon'srelation to pastphilosophies. And
there are, as well, a number of importantworks that have evaluated the status of rhetoric
and dialectic in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (seeAshworth, Jardine, Lechner,
Gilbert, Howell). My aimhere is not toprovide additional insight into these studies, but
rather to stress that Bacon's conceptof rhetoric and his appraisal of its worthmust be seen
in light of this appraisal of all received tradition.
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Bacon's allusions to rhetoric must be read as a parallel strain, in the context of his
criticisms against the "defects and undervalues" of all traditional learning. As Bacon refers
to the defects in argumentation, he means to point specifically to the limitations he finds in
the syllogistic logic that is at the foundation ofAristotelian and scholastic traditions. And
as he refers to vain eloquence, he intends to argue specifically against the excessive
imitation of Ciceronian figures as practiced by some in the humanist tradition. Bacon
argues that as men have been concerned with disputation and argument and have relied on
authorityor have been carried away by the whirlof eloquenceand the imitation of classical
texts, they have gone astray and have abandonedexperience and investigation entirely.
Bacon believes thus that his new vision of progress requires a break with traditional
learning, and likewisea breakwith the rhetorical tradition, of the seventeenth century. As
he argues, though, for a newmethodand a course of experimentation by whichmenmight
address themselves to new discoveries, he also fashions a new rhetoric with an alliance to
rational action that also works to advance the progress of science.
Received Rhetorical Tradition
Lisa Jardinedocuments the attempt bycontemporary rhetoricians in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries to assign to rhetoricmerely the function of ornamentation. She
clearly documents thereorganization of the trivium from the fourteenth century through the
sixteenth century thatsubordinated rhetoric todialectic and thus leftit with only formal
composition, omamentation, anddelivery (19). Jardine, asnoted, hasargued thatBacon
follows theeducational reformers in the sixteenth century ashe reserves the termrhetoric
forillustration and omamentation. Karl Wallace suggests, in fact, thatin noting thevarious
places where Bacon's incidental comments allude tothe nature ofrhetoric, a reader might
certainly infer that Bacon views rhetoric asmerely omamentation orfigures of speech (51).
He points toplaces where Bacon alludes to rhetoric as "adornment," as the dressing up of
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ideas for popular discourse. In the Advancement, for instance. Bacon cites the arts oflogic
andrhetoric and suggests thatas theone is for "judgment," theotheris for "ornament"
{Advancement II65). Wallace asserts, though, thatBacon's allusion to rhetoric as merely
ornamentation"seems to be uncritical and transitory, and probably indicates merely that he
wasawareof the attempt, by thosecontemporary rhetoricians whoendeavored strictly to
compartmentalize thearts, to identify rhetorical discourse with ornamental presentation"
(51).
The reorganization of the trivium and the hardandcertaindivisionof the sciences
common from the twelfth through the sixteenth centurycertainlyproved detrimental to the
status of rhetoric. Brian Vickers notes that medieval rhetoric suffered a diminished status
as its place in the triviumwas constantly usurped by dialectic or theology. He refers to
RichardMcKeon's classic essay concerning the demiseof rhetoric to note the influence of
scholasticismand the method of dialectic that led to the fragmentation of rhetoric. He finds
that the scholastic emphasis on logical methodology subordinated rhetoric to dialectic,
strippedit of its teaching on invention, and divorcedit from its practical implications.
Vickersquotes fromMcKeon to point out that as rhetoric, too,was incorporated into
theology it was used as "an instrument to 'clarify themeanings and remove the ambiguities
of scriptural statements' and to systematizecollectionsof authorities" (229). However, the
"most crucial change in medieval rhetoric," according to McKeon, was the resultant shift
from "subject matters" to 'Verbal forms" as rhetoricbecamea "simple art of words" (qtd. in
Vickers 230-31). The intellectualism of scholastic rationalism and its emphasis upon
logical methods of argumentation left littie concern for a rhetoric defined as mere
ornamentation and style.
But while rhetoric's status suffered from the domination of scholasticism in the
universities through the Middle Ages, its development during humanist educational reforms
of the fifteenth century remained, unfortunately, deficient. Vickers notes that an important
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readjustment took place in thebalance of the trivium as the humanist reform in the
educational curriculum increased the time spent on rhetoric andallowed it greater emphasis.
But evenwhilenew humanist attitudes rejected medieval fragmentation of the rhetorical
tradition, the humanist aim torestore theprestige of classical rhetoric yielded questionable
results. While Renaissance humanists rediscovered classical texts and stressed the five
parts of thecanon, they nevertheless pursued elocutio with the greatest zest. Vickers notes
thatmany rhetoricians found elocutio to be more important than invention and someeven
pursued it at theexpense of dispositio (282-83). Henotes thatreferences toCicero's and
Quintilian's description of elocutio as an all important skill servedas humanists'
justification formaking eloquence central to their work (273). Vickers notes, in fact, that
humanistrhetoricians regardedelocutio neverasmereornamentation, but rather as a
complex termconnoting "prudence and knowledge" (283). Andyetmany, nevertheless,
whopursued eloquence withgreatinterest, tended to give only aperfunctory treatment of
rhetoric - treatment that stressed elegance in literaryexpressionand use of appropriate
figures of speech, and thatwasconcemed primarily with theimitation ofLatinmodels,
particularly passages of Cicero's works (259).
Wallace suggests, however, that Bacon puts omamentation and style in their proper
place early in theAdvancement as he proceeds to articulate his quarrel with all received
learning. The intention of the first book of theAdvancement is to provide a defense of
learning. The book proceeds both to set forth the weaknesses of traditional learning, as it
restricts knowledge to what has been discovered by received philosophies, and to persuade
statesmen to look forward to a new method by which new knowledge might be discovered
and learning thus improved. There are. Bacon argues, three weakness or "distempers" of
traditional learning: fantastical learningwith its "vain imaginations,"contentious learning
and "vain altercations," and delicate learning or "vain affectations" {Advancement 125).
40
The Attack Against Humanism
Bacon treats first the distemper of delicate learning, when "men study words and
not matter" - a distemper characteristic, Bacon argues, of the humanistic scholars. Bacon
cites the influence ofMartin Luther on the humanist revival of classical texts. As Luther
called upon ancient authors to support his present argument against the traditions of the
church, he emphasized Greek and Latin learning so that
the ancient authors, both in divinity and in humanity, which had long time
slept in libraries, began generally to be read and revolved. This by
consequence did draw on a necessity of a more exquisite travail in the
languages original, wherein those authors did write, for the better
understanding of those authors, and the better advantage of pressing and
applying their words. And thereof grew again a delight in their manner of
style and phrase, and an admiration of that kind of writing....
{Advancement 125)
Bacon notes briefly what has caused this distemper, the tendency to seek style rather than
matter
so that these four cause concurring, the admiration of ancient authors, the
hate of the schoolmen, the exact study of languages, and the efficacy of
preaching, did bring in an affectionate study of eloquence and copie of
speech which then began to flourish. This grew speedily to an excess; for
men began to hunt more after words than matter; more after the choiceness
of the phrase, and the round and clean compositionof the sentence, and the
sweet falling of the clauses, and the varying and illustration of their works
with tropes and figures, than after the weight of matter, worth of subject,
soundness of argument, life of invention, or depth of judgment....
{Advancement 126)
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Arthur Johnston asserts in notes to thispassagethatevenwhileBaconvery much admires
Cicero and also imitates his use of rhetorical figures, he condemns "those fanatics who
slavishly confined themselves toCiceronian vocabulary, rhythms, andfigures" andfor
whom thepurityofLatin is moreimportant than itsmatter (225). As noted earlier, the
humanist movement is far more interested in an intellectual life than the kind of
preoccupation with adornment andstyleoversubstance andcontent for which Bacon
attacked them. We might, nevertheless, continue to read closely Bacon's complaint here.
Bacon attacks thosewhopracticedCiceronian imitation to excess. He continues by naming
specific persons he finds to beparticularly guilty of this distemper, andasserts that these
scholars spend"infinite andcurious painsupon Cicero theOrator..and that they "with
their lectures and writings almost deify Cicero...(Advancement 126). Bacon
denounces those scholars who are concerned with style for its own sake and who confine
their studies to the imitation of Ciceronian figures. These scholars, he suggests, have
caused an affectation detrimental to the advancement of learning.
While humanism may not have deserved the harsh criticism it receives from Bacon
for being interested only in style and decoration, the movement, admittedly, was not
generally interested in pursuing science or the study of nature. The humanists tended
toward skepticism concerning the ability of the scholastic method or of deductive logic to
come to any satisfactory conclusions. And they doubted whether any universal knowledge
could be attained. The humanists were concerned "predominately with texts, language,
style, and correct reading and annotation of authors" (Johnston 91) and were thus less
involved with the investigation of nature that Bacon advocated. They confined their study
to the arts and to human nature. Paolo Rossi asserts that the humanist ideals and form of
education were, then, "diametrically opposed to Bacon's own principles" (59). Bacon
rejected their skepticism and argued that natural science and a new inductive logic would
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create the necessary conditions to secure the experimental knowledge toward whichBacon
aspired.
The Attack Against Scholasticism
Themost importantandmost severeof Bacon's criticismis pointedat "contentious
leaming," by which he means scholasticismand its Aristotelian tradition. He asserts that
"vain matter is worse than vain words" {Advancement 127) and generally prefers the
humanists* skepticism to the scholastics' dogmatism. He refers here to the "kind of
degenerate leaming" that
did chiefly reign amongst the schoolmen: who having sharp and strong
witSj and abundance of leisure, and small variety of reading, but their wits
being shut up in the cells of a few authors (chiefly Aristotle their dictator)
,.. and knowing little history, either of nature or time, did out of no great
quantity ofmatter and infinite agitation of wit spin out unto us those
laborious webs of leaming which are extant in their books. {Advancement I
27-8)
Margery Purver observes that well into the sixteenth century Aristotelian science still
conditioned the academic approach to the exploration of nature; further "it constituted a
fundamental obstruction to future development in that it provided the only system of
sciences that there was" (33). Bacon criticizes "Aristotelian" science as it had been handed
down from the Schoolmen "for whom it had acquired an authoritarianism never claimed by
Aristotle himself (Purver 26). As Rossi notes, this "distemper of leaming" necessarily
spreads beyond medieval scholasticism, farther into the past. Bacon condemned scholastic
leaming because it relied upon authority from the ancients, and he thus links his attacks of
scholasticism with attacks against Aristotelian philosophy.
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A. RupertHall in documenting "the formation of themodemscientific mind" notes
that ThomasAquinas in the thirteenth century was,perhaps, the foremostproponentof
Aristotelianism, which in medieval Europe was reconciled with and thus transformed by
Catholic theology. He argues, as well, that despite Aquinas' studyof Aristotle's work,"he
utterly failed to understand the true spirit andmethodsof natural science" (5). Bacon
denounces scholasticism, then, for endangeringnatural science by incorporatingAristotle's
philosophy into religion:
But as in the inquiry of the divine truth, their pride inclined to leave the
oracle ofGod's word, and to vanish in the mixture of their own inventions;
so in the inquisition of nature, they ever left the oracle of God's works, and
adored the deceiving and deformed images which the unequal mirror of their
own minds, or a few received authors or principles, did represent unto
them. (Advancement 129)
Bacon suggests that as the scholastics succeeded in distorting Aristotle's philosophy and
thus the status of scientific theory, they succeeded in distorting nature and, ironically.
Scripture, as well. In a debased form, then, Aristotle was made the master of medieval
thinking.
Bacon considered the orthodox Aristotelian tradition of the scholastics a great
hindrance to the advancement of learning because it was content with abstract speculations
and produced no practical results. He accuses Aristotle of beginning philosophy with few
inquiries and reaching conclusions, thus turning from just a few findings to an all-inclusive
theory. And he proceeds then to be most critical in his objection to the scholastics as they
followed Aristotle's logical method in starting from first principles and proceeding by
deduction to general truths. He describes the scholastic method of study by disputation:
"upon every particular position or assertion to frame objections, and to those objections,
solutions; which solutions were for the most part not confutations, but distinctions" and to
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suggest that this approach unsatisfactory because it"rests not so much upon evidence of
truth proved byarguments, authorities, similitudes, examples, asupon particular
confutations and solutions of every scruple, cavillation, andobjection; breeding for the
most partonequestion as fast as it solveth another" so that it ends with "monstrous
altercations and barking questions" {Advancement 128-29). Bacon finds scholastic
inquiries tobethus subjected toa kind ofrefutation that resulted in little other than an
endless to-and-fro debateconcerning already familiar assumptions. He asserts that this
kindof deductive, syllogistic reasoning only extricates whathasalready beenreceived on
authority and cannot provide any new knowledge.
Bacon sees the medieval scholars, then, as orderers of authoritatively received
learning rather than as creators of genuinely new knowledge. Hemaintains that because
syllogistic logic accepted traditional theories and precluded invention or discovery, it had
no legitimate placein science. Further, he argues that the scholastics didmuch harmto
learning by seeking truth solely through operations of logic anddisputation rather than
from direct observation of nature. He thus uses his attacks against scholasticism and its
Aristotelian influence to call learningback from sheeroperations of the intellect alone,
detached from thematerialworld, and to emphasize the fruits of inquiryderived
additionally from direct contact with nature.
Attack Against All Concerning Deceit or Untruth
The third distemper of learning is the uncritical dissemination and acceptanceof
dubious learning. Bacon warns here of the "accepting or admitting things weakly
authorized or warranted" {Advancement130). He distinguishes, then, between two kinds
of credulity: one regardinghistory, bothecclesiastical andnatural, and the other regarding
arts and sciences. In discussing credulity in matters regarding arts and sciences. Bacon
complains again that ancientauthors havebeengiven toomuchcredit: "And as for the
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overmuch credit thathath been given unto authors in sciences, inmaking them dictators,
that in their words shouldstand,and not consuls to giveadvice; the damage is infinitethat
sciences have receivedthereby, as the principal causethat hathkept them low at a stay
without growth or advancement" {Advancement131). Bacon's dissatisfaction with ancient
authors ismade explicit in his comparison between the "mechanical" orproductive arts,
which with practice have progressed intime, and the arts ofphilosophy and science
propounded byAristotle and Plato, which by uncritical acceptance have only stagnated and
become corrupt. Philosophers and scientists have accepted Aristotle as their dictator and
have done little more than record commentaries on his work. In so doing, however, "they
have rather depraved than illustrated" his method:
For as water will not ascendhigher than the level of the first springhead
from whence it descendeth, so knowledgederived from Aristotle, and
exempt from liberty and examination, will notriseagain higher than the
knowledge of Aristotle... for disciples doowe to masters only a
temporary belief and suspension of their own judgement till they befully
instructed, and not an absolute resignation or perpetual captivity
{Advancement 133)
The arts and sciences will be free of theirimprisonment by dogmatic Aristotelian science
onlywhenartists and scientists begin to subject Aristotelian method to examination and
criticism.
Bacon*s argument here is an important one. He critiques the uncritical acceptance
of opinion and advocates instead the critical pursuit of artsandsciences. NealGilbert notes
that theRenaissance respect for antiquity is oneof thefactors that lead seventeenth-century
science, especially in its earlyformation, to turn predominantiy critical (xvii). Renaissance
scientists found themselves at every stepconfronted with the avowedmeritsof Aristotle
and his followers. Bacon argues that scientistsmust now be ready to subject Aristotle to
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external criticism and even to attemptmajor revisions or to reject these theories, if they are
"further and further to discover truth" {Advancement 132). Scientists must attempt
investigation so as to acceptor rejecttheories asvalid based on a degree of observational
andexperimental evidence ratherthan on thedictates of dogmatic conviction. It is this
critical aspect, then, that predominates much of Bacon's work.
The remaining errors andvanities of learning thatBacon identifies in Book I tend to
reflect the complaints againstHumanism andScholasticism already articulated. The chief
among the remainingerrors is, again, admiration for antiquity. Baconcomplainsfurther
that an affectionfor antiquity looks only backward for newknowledge and does so without
re-examination. Closely related to this error is the second, that being a "distrust that
anythingshould be now to be foundout, which the world shouldhavemissed and passed
over so long time" {Advancement I 33). And the third is, as well, tied to the second: "a
conceit that of former opinions and sects after variety and examination the best hath still
prevailedand suppressed the rest; so as if a man should begin the labourof a new search,
he were but like to light upon somewhat formerly rejected" {Advancement 133). Baconis
here speaking of the despair in believing that the best knowledgehad come from antiquity
and there was thus nothing left to discover. Such despair discourages any search for new
learning. Another error, Bacon argues, is "too great a reverance, and a kind of adoration of
the mind and understanding ofman; by means whereof, men have withdrawn themselves
too much from the contemplation of nature, and the observations of experience, and have
tumbled up and down in their own reason and conceits" {Advancement 134). Bacon here
refers to the belief that knowledge is derived entirely from the reasoning action of the
intellect. And he admonishes those who turn from observation of nature wholly to pursue,
instead, intellectual contemplation. He further articulates the error in the "impatience of
doubt, and haste to assertion without due and mature suspension ofjudgement"
{Advancement 135). And he notes the related error in the manner of the delivery of
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knowledge "in a sortasmaybesoonest believed, and noteasiest examined" (Advancement
135). Bacon is concerned again that science has become toosoon satisfied with its
opinions and has assumed further inquiry tobeunnecessary. And he isworried, aswell,
that science has delivered itself so as to have its art appearperfect and to make others
believe andaccept what hasbeen discovered, rather than to"propound things sincerely"
{Advancement 135).
Finally, though. Bacon comes towhat heidentifies as the greatest of allerrors, "the
mistaking ormisplacing of thelast or furtherest end ofknowledge" (Advancement 136).
Menhave pursued knowledge for differing reasons, sometimes because of natural
curiosity, sometimes for entertainment or delight, sometimes forreputation, and sometimes
for"lucreandprofession" rather than to give a true account of their gift for thebenefit of
men. He asserts thatwhatwill trulydignify andexaltknowledge will be "if contemplation
and action maybe morenearly andstraitly conjoined andunited together" (Advancement I
36). Knowledge ought to be sought not for delight in itself, but in the union of
contemplation with action for the benefit and use of men.
Reformation for Advancement
Scholastic and humanistic philosophies continued to reign as the staplemodeof
thought in English universities until the end of the sixteenthcentury so that when Bacon
comes to the early seventeenthcentury "an entire systemof sciences, stultified and
incapableof growth, stillprevailed in the universities" and thusdominated academic
learning (Purver 28). It was at this point, argues R. F. Jones, that "scientific progress
depended primarilyupona favorable outcome in the controversy between themoderns and
the upholders of antiquity, in which sciencewas and continued to be the central issue until
the end of the century" (5). Bacon's denouncement of the entire structure of thinking
expounded by existing philosophies grows out of this tension. He believed that "progress
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in knowledge was possible onlywhen theground hadbeen completely cleared and a new
foundation laid" and thatmenmust begin "from theveryfoundations and effect a total
reconstruction of all sciences" (Jones 11). Bacon's appraisalof rhetoric must be
interpreted in thiscontext as it is complicated byhismost significant complaints against
received traditions: the extreme reverence for the authority of antiquity and the uncritical
acceptance of received learning, the intellectual contemplation of "truth"at theexclusion of
activeengagementwithnature, and therelatedmisplacement of the endsof knowledge.
Comments concerning rhetoric which appear here - comments which areoftencitedto
supportan interpretation that finds Baconto limitrhetoric to ornamentation - shouldbe
read carefully,in full context, so as to consider the actual state of affairswithinwhich
Bacon soughtreform. WhenBacon is critical of the rhetorical tradition, then, he is
concerned with both Medieval rhetoric in its scholastic manifestation as it relies upon
authority and is reduced to style, and Renaissance rhetoric in its extreme humanist or Neo-
Ciceronian manifestation with its reliance upon classical texts and emphasis upon
ornamental presentation. I would arguethatBacon seeks to reformrhetoricby redefining
it as an important and serious rational operation.
Bacon was particularly concernedwith tiieconceptionof rhetoric as ornamentation.
He was cautious of knowledge that was communicated so as to be believed entirely and to
move men quickly to judgment, rather than to be examined for its weaknesses. Rossi notes
that Bacon would have been familiar with the kind of description as to rhetoric's power to
sway judgment, as in this description by Ben Johnson of Bacon himself:
Yet there happened in my time one noble speaker, who was full of gravity
in his speaking His hearers could not cough, or look aside from him,
without loss. He commanded where he spoke; and had his judges angry
and pleased at his devotion. No man had their affections more in his
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power. The fear ofevery man that heard him, was lest he should make an
end. (qtd in Rossi 183)
Andhenotes that these qualities of oratory arethose that Bacon sooften opposes. Bacon
was cautiousof rhetoricreduced to elocution andput to the use of conveying information in
away tobebelieved rather than examined. He believed that knowledge delivered insuch a
way inhibits further inquiry. And he asserts that this type ofpersuasion has no place inthe
direct investigation of nature.
Wallace andRossi areright, then, to find in Bacon's appraisal an argument that
rhetoric oughtnot bereduced to style or ornamentation. Rossi's assertion that"Bacon's
polemics against a form ofknowledge favouring verbosity rather than serious inquiry are
radically opposed to an inteipretation of rhetoric asmere ornament" (179) seems
particularly apt. Bacon, in fact, attacks Plato for his conception ofrhetoric "as a voluptuary
art" and instead considers it an intellectual art, one "excellent and excellently well laboured"
{Advancement1139-40). ButWallace and Rossi are admittedly conservative in their own
estimation of Bacon's final appraisal of rhetoric. They emphasize that Bacon,nevertheless,
excludes rhetoric from the rigorous methods of the new science.
I would argue, however, that becauseBacon is concemedwith the tendency of men
to bepersuaded by emotion and thusrush too soon to judgment, he is careful in his
programfor reform to redefinerhetoric as a rational art thatworksin termsof his faculty
psychology to tum menfrom contemplation toward reasoned action. The appropriate
function of rhetoric, to strike the imagination so that the judgments of reason move men to
positiveactions,becomesimmensely important, then, for whatBacon advocates as the
furthest ends of knowledge. Bacon emphasizes the proper province of rhetoric, as it works
toward thepresentation of ideas so as to support andevenprotect reason and as it is rooted
in the sphere of action.
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Reformation for the Ends of Knowledge
Gilbert asserts that "Renaissance scientists found themselves in a world already
theorized to death, so to speak " andargues that"the seventeenth century had to fight its
way back to a fresh view ofnature bystripping itself ofcenturies" of traditional speculation
andbookish learning and bydictating amore acdve scientific method (xvi). Bacon points
himselfto his "constant and distinctwarning that by themethods nowin use neithercan
anygreatprogress bemadein thedoctrines andcontemplative part of sciences, norcan
they be carried out to anymagnitude ofworks" (y/orks VIII160). Again, forBacon the
greatest injury to the advancement of knowledge is themisplacement of the ends of
knowledge and the error in failing to seekan active, utilitarian goal for science. He states:
I would giveone general admonition to all; that theyconsiderthe trueends
of knowledge, and not seek it eitherfor the gratification of the mind,or for
contention, or that theymaydespise others,or for emolument or fame, or
power, or such low things; but for the benefitand use of life; and that they
perfect and govern in charity (qtd. in Anderson 96)
Bacon's idea of science has traditionally been characterized as extremely practical and
regarded as expressly utilitarian.
According to Anderson, in fact.Baconfound the end of the newmethod to be its
operationin use and action. JulianMartin alsopoints to Bacon's argument that delight,
contentment, and enlightenment are not the sole ends of inquiry. She suggests that the
man of knowledge must accept active responsibility to. in Bacon's words, "endow the life
ofman with infinite commodities" (66). Jones too finds that Bacon condemns the pursuit
of leaming for contemplation only and argues at every stage for a progressive seeking of
benefits. And Rossi argues, as well, that for Bacon, science is not a luxurious and
detached contemplation or aspiring towards truth. He notes, further, that Bacon refuted
traditional philosophy as it had "turned man from natural investigations" and "substituted
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contemplation for action" (43), andheproposed instead a progressive science based on
"the union of knowledge and action" (27).
Medieval opinion, according toHall, favored amore contemplative than practical
view of science. It followed an Aristotelian definition of "knowledge as 'understanding*
(passive knowledge) rather than *power tocontrol* (active knowledge)" (Hall 163). And
Purver says thatBacon believed it was through the split between the intellectual and the
utilitarian that science had become sterile, and so "a total reconstruction of the system of
sciences must be based on an alliance between these two spheres" (34). Jerry Weinberger
asserts too thatBaconprescribes as the ends governing science "the unity of theory and
practice,... a single method or means for thediscovery of all things and the commanding
of nature in action" (229).
Bacon does state explicitiy that"human knowledge andhuman powermeet in one**
{Works Vin 67). He explains further:
Although the roads to humanpower and to human knowledge lie close
together, and are nearly the same, nevertheless on account of the pernicious
and inveterate habit of dwelling on abstractions, it is safer to begin and raise
the sciences from those foundations which have relation to practice, and to
let the active part itself be as the seal which prints and determines the
contemplative counteipart. i^orksVlU 169)
As he continues, he sets forth the following "rule or guidance" for both practical operations
and contemplative knowledge: "For a true and perfectrule of operation then the direction
wiU be that it be certain, free, and disposing or leading to action'^and "for a true and perfect
axiom ofknowledge then the direction and percept will be, that another nature be
discovered which is convertible with the given nature, and yet is a limitation ofa more
general nature, as ofa true and real genus.*' He concludes, finally, that "these two
directions, the one active and the other contemplative, are one and the same thing; and what
52
in operation is most useful, that in knowledge ismost true" {Works Vin 171). Bacon thus
conceived of powerandknowledge, action andcontemplation, as the substance of his new
method.
Antonio Perez-Ramos looks closely at the concept of utility in Bacon's idea of
science and at the claim that Bacon advocates useful and practical knowledge rather than
theoretical or intellectual inquiry,and he concludes that Bacon's science, in fact, "was
precisely an attempt at integrating the two"(136). Perez-Ramos looks at the term"opus"as
it appears in Bacon's workand to consider further Bacon's ideasconceming the concept of
utility. He notes:
Baconrepeatedly declares thathis aimis neither contemplation (conceptual
grasp as in the oldAristotelian scientia) nor"res cumprincipiis
consentanea" (a fictionalist or instrumentalist stance mainly connected with
astronomical theory), but rather the production of opera, of "works" (in
Bacon's ownEnglish), whose goal is "the endowmentof man's life with
new commodities." (136)
He explains thatmany passagesin Bacon's works indicate that he did have an appreciation
for the pursuit of theoretical truth and notmerely its utilitarian applications. According to
Perez-Ramos, then. Bacon advocates in his conceptionof science the active engagement of
men in the "realm of the doable, the makeable, the constructable" not as areplacement-of
but in-addition-to, "over and above the intellectual apprehension of them in the old
demonstrative fashion" (143). And he suggests, then, that Bacon celebrates the "equation
between scientia and potentia" (148).
Perez-Ramos continues, then, by noting that Bacon refers to science repeatedly as
"the study of Nature with a view to works (ad opera)" (140). And as he considers tiie
accepted use of the term opera in the seventeenth century he finds: "Opera belongs to the
semantic field of doing and making, that is, it refers both to the action to be performed and
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to theproduct of the action performed, both to the act ofworking and totheresult ofwork"
(141). He asserts that the knower in Bacon's science is conceived ideally as "he who
makes, does, or produces" (148). And, finally, he argues that themethod of induction
establishes opus in Baconianscienceas "knowledge-in-action" (162).
In conclusion, then, if we note Bacon's conceptionof science as "knowledge-in-
action'* and understandBacon's goal to be, as Purver also identifies,in Bacon's words,
"these twinobjects, human Knowledge andhuman Power" which "do reallymeetin one"
(50), wemightfurtherfollow Purver's argument thatBacon "neverregarded the growth of
science as a rigidexercise in which practice andintellect were employed at separate stages"
(37). And if, then, we continue by noting rhetoric's re-defined function in Bacon's system
of faculty psychology as the onlyart towork on behalf of thereason tomove thewill to
action, we might be poisednow to consider a more liberal interpretation of rhetoric's place
and function in Bacon's new method for the scientific investigation of nature and within his
plan for the farthest ends of knowledge.
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CHAPTER III. THE FACULTIES AND THE FUNCTION OF RHETORIC
As we conceive of Bacon's aim in the new science to be the unity of knowledge and
action, wemight turn now to examinemoreclosely Bacon's entire systemof faculty
psychology, bywhich individual faculties are employed, asWallace says, "either as
instruments of knowingor as meansof action"("Bacon's Conception" 115). I believethat
embedded in Bacon's faculty psychology areimplications for therelation between rhetoric
and sciencethat haveescapednoticein muchof theprevious scholarship. WhenBacon
comes to treat the illustration of tradition, or rhetoric, he defines his conception of
rhetoric'sworkin terms of its relation to specific human faculties: "the duty andoffice of
rhetoric is to applyreason to the imagination for thebetter moving of thewill." It is
necessary, then, beforeexamining further Bacon'sconception of thefunction of rhetoric,
first to consider rhetoric's relation to the faculties of reason and imagination and thus to
more explicitly expound the faculty psychology that emerges from Bacon's system.
The Faculties: An Overview
The facultypsychology that informs Bacon's definition of rhetoric is at the
foundation of his entire plan for knowledge and learning. Theories of faculty psychology,
theories which assumed that the mind could be best understood by dividing it into a number
of"faculties," each with its own rational power, were dominant during the period. Bacon
comments on these:
The faculties of the soul are well-known; understanding, reason,
imagination,memory, appetite, will; in short all with which the logical and
ethical sciences deal. But in the doctrine conceming the soul the origins of
these faculties ought to be handled, and that physically, as they are innate
and inherent in the soul; the uses only and objects of them being deputed to
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other arts. In whichpart nothing of muchvalue (inmy opinion) has yet
beendiscovered; though I cannot report it as deficient. (Works IX 51)
WhileBacon himselfdoes not present in anyoneplace a unifiedaccountof a faculty
psychology, ashe proceeds in theAdvancement to develop a full classification of
knowledge, he proceeds, as well, topresent anunderlying system of psychological
faculties, one thatWallacearguesis illustrative of thepsychology of the time. In Francis
Bacon on theNature ofMan,Wallace turns to bothBacon's ownworks and the literature
of the time to explainBacon's faculty psychology for the explicit purposeof better
understanding Bacon's thought and specifically hisviews of rhetoric. Wallace, Jardine,
andCogan coverwell the complexities ofBacon's theory of faculty psychology; and as
these conceptions of Bacon's psychology inform much of thecommentary on Bacon's
rhetorical theory, theirexplications will prove particularly significant for mypurposes here.
Wallace suggests thatBacon's interestconceming theproblemof acquiring and
using knowledge leads himto construct hisclassification in terms of thepsychological
faculties by which and throughwhich, he believes, mancomes to know and act (Nature
55). Bacon's classification of knowledge into the threemost generaldivisions - History,
Poetry, andPhilosophy- corresponds to the chief faculties - Memory, Imagination, and
Reason: 'The parts of human learning have reference to the three parts of man's
understandings which is the seat of learning: history to his memory, poesy to his
imagination, and philosophy to his reason" {Advancement n 67). As these general
divisions then give way to further classification, Bacon comes to distinguish between two
kinds of man's faculties, "the one respecting his understanding and reason, and the other
his will, appetite, and affection; whereof the former produceth position or decree, the latter
action or execution" {Advancement II116). As all knowledge is further classified then into
individual arts and sciences, a complete system based on the six rational faculties -
understanding, reason, imagination, memory, will, and appetite - gets articulated.
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Wallace notes that Bacon's division of knowledge and the faculties is basedon the
relationship ofknowledge toaction (56). The Intellectual Arts and the corresponding
faculties of understanding and reason enable man toknow. Wallace points toBacon's
division of the Intellectual Arts into invention, judgment, memory, andelocution and
suggests that Bacon so names the intellectual arts because they involve a given set of
human faculties, most notably theunderstanding and reason, operating concurrently (113).
Wallace describes the faculty of understanding in Bacon'ssystem as thepowerto abstract
and apprehend, activities that enable man to consider and tointerpret his experience and
form hisideas. Theunderstanding, then, engages in invention as it works to abstract and
apprehend from available materials and proceeds to construct ideas. Wallace continues by
noting theclose relationship thatthefaculty of understanding shares with thatof reason.
Bacon, in fact, suggests thatthe"thesame action of themind which inventeth, judgeth"
(Advancement n 124), Wallace argues, though, thatwhile the activities of inventionand
judgment work inclose concert, they are differentiated inthat as the mind passes onwhat it
has inventedor discovered through the understanding, the validity and truthof the
invention is judgedby thereason. While theoperations of the faculty of understanding
thus are interpretive, those of the reason are critical, deliberative and evaluative (117). The
reason is responsible for thecritical appraisal and rigorous analysis of theresults of
invention. Further, tiien, both the understanding and the reason also work in close relation
with the faculty of memory, as its power is the recordingof experience. The memory
receives, records and thus preserves the products of the understanding, the reason - and
the imagination, as well (57).
Wallace also notes that Bacon's conceptions of the faculties of the will and the
appetiteare distinct from the understanding, thereason, and thememory,in that the powers
of the will and the appetite enable a man to act. Wallacenotes that Bacon found the two
faculties to be "essential to action" (138). The will differs from the appetite, though, in so
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much asit yields the conscious power ofchoice - it yields "thepower of saying yes orno
prior to action'* (135). The will, as distinct from the appetite, acts as the cause ofreflective
behavior; "a decision by the will was always necessary if rational thought were toresult in
action" (141), Thewill is concerned with voluntary anddeliberative motion, thekindof
rnotion that allows a man to decide "whether to act or not to act, to believe or not to believe"
(135). In orderfor thewill to secure action, however, it hadfirst to be acted upon.
As theimagination works topresent the images either of the senses or thereason, it
has the force to rouse the affections and move the will. The imagination is, in Jardine's
estimation, "the intermediary bothbetween theearliest intellectual imagesand the reason,
and between rational assessmentof a situationand the subsequent (ethical and emotional)
decision to act" (91).Wallace too notes that in Bacon's view the imaginationacts as a
messenger between the faculties of the reason and the will asit makes images available to
reason for contemplation andjudgment andavailable to thewill for action (74). Bacon
explains:
sense sends all kinds of imagesover to the imagination for reason to judge
of; and reason againwhenit hasmadeits judgment and selection, sends
themover to imagination before thedecreebe put in execution. For
voluntary motion is everpreceded andincited by imagination; so that
imagination is as a common instrument to both,- both reason andwill.
{Works IX 61)
The imagination transfers sensoryimages to the reasonto bejudged, afterwhich they are
kept for further contemplation or, once a decision has beenmade,passed on to thewill so
that the decision can be executed. The imagination, as Cogan asserts, "stands in the center
of all human activities ... and thus wields an inescapable influence over both thought and
action" (216). Without aid of the imagination, Wallace argues, "human reason cannot
operateand the humanwill cannotdetermine upon a lineof action"{FrancisBacon 38). It
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is thefaculty of theimagination anditsoperations with reason and thewill that illustrate the
place rhetoric occupiesin the processof action.
The Function of Rhetoric
In summary, then, theunderstanding and reason engage in inventive activities, and
thereason thenjudges the results. Wallace points out thatthe understanding andreason
thus yield contemplative, deliberative knowledge. But this knowledge constitutes only a
potential foraction {Nature 56). Tosecure action, the understanding and reason need the
help of thewill,which is moved by thereason'sjudgments and in tummoves knowledge
to action. Cogan notes that in Bacon's system thefaculties eitherof reason or thewillcarry
outallintellectual operations. Theprovince ofreason claims "allrational determination of
what constitutes the better course of action" and the authority of the will claims "every
choice or practical judgment as to the actual action to bepursued" (214). And, again, the
imagination is pivotal as it acts as a messenger between the understanding and the reason
and between the reason and the will.
We might note here the import of rhetoric, as its duty and office is to apply the
reason to imagination in order to excite the will, and as it works to bridge the gulf between
rational knowledge and the will to apply such knowledge. Cogan observes that "of the
rational arts of communication, only rhetoric addresses the imagination; of the arts that
address the imagination, only rhetoric is informedby the reason, and only it has as its end
the rational management of action" (219). Wallace, too, observes that "rhetoric is the only
art, serious in intent, which utilizes the imagination in obedience to the dictates of reason"
{FrancisBacon 27). While the other logical arts are also tied to reason, they are concerned
with speculative and contemplativeknowledge- only rhetoric is both tied to reason and
positioned to influence action.
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Rhetoric's utility as a source of action is particularly important because in Bacon's
scheme reason alone is not always dependable and cannot work to influence action.
Jardine notes that in Bacon's view, had the mind not been corrupted by the Fall, "an act of
will would prompt a man to action whenever reason judged that action to be to his overall
good" (94). However, because the faculties of reason and will are naturally limited and are
compelled sometimes by the passions, the reason needs help in compelling the will to act.
And as Howell notes, learned men are as equally weak in tending toward unreason,
emotion, and prejudice as the popular community (Logic 373). Bacon asserts:
If the affections themselves were brought to order, and pliant and obedient
to reason, it is true there would be no great use of persuasions and
insinuations to give access to the mind, but naked and simple propositions
and proofs would be enough. But the affectations do on the contrary make
such successions and raise such mutinies and seditions... that reason
would become captive and servile, if eloquence of persuasions did not win
the imagination from the affection's part, and contract a confederacy
between the reason and imagination against them. {Advancement 11140-41)
Rhetoric works persuasively "to fill the imagination to second reason, and not to oppress
it" (Advancemeint n 140). Rhetoric strikes otherwise abstract or distant images of the
reasonvivid and present to the imagination so that the imagination can in turn represent
these attractively to the will, which can then move to dictate rational action.
This process works, as Jardine notes, not only in persuading others to act but in
one's own actions as well (94). Cogan argues extensively to make the point that rhetoric's
function is not limitedto communication between people, but that it is "evident that the
same faculties operate, the same functions occur, and the same requirements existin the
caseof each individual" (222). To support his argument Cogan quotes thefollowing
statement from Bacon's DeAugmentis:
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For as in negotiations with others, men areusually wrought eitherby
cunning,or by importunity, or by vehemency: so likewise in this
negotiationwithin ourselves^ we areeitherundermined by fallacies of
arguments, or solicited andimportuned byassiduity of impressions and
observations, or agitated and transported byviolenceof passions, (qtd in
Cogan 223).
AndCogan explains then that for eachindividual, thereason stands in needof rhetoric's
power to translate its conclusions to theimagination soas toachieve rational control of
one's actions (223). He arguesfurther that because the "unaidedspeculative reason is
incapable'* of controlling the imagination, unless an individual possesses rhetorical skill,
"he or sheremains a kind of paraplegic, able to think, but unable to capitalize on the results
of this thinking'* in action (225). Finally, Cogan concludes thatrhetorical knowledge is
necessary if action is to be genuinely rational. WhileWallace, Jardine, and Coganlimit
their assessment of what they find to beBacon's definition of rhetoric's function and its
place in the structureof action to the realmof ethics andpersonal conduct, I wouldargue
that embedded within Bacon's descriptionof rhetoric's function are implications for
rhetoric's place in the new science.
Rhetorical Action in the New Scientific Method
James Spedding, in his preface to Bacon's Novum Organum^ notes that there is "no
didacticexpositionof [Bacon's] methodin thewhole of his writings" (Works 1155) and
that "very few of those who have spoken of Bacon have understood his method, or have
even attempted to explain its distinguishing features" (Works 1150). And as noted, neither
does Bacon present any unified account of faculty psychologyor any complete theory of
rhetoric. I will conclude here by offering an account of the structure of Bacon's science
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and by explicating the connection I posit exists between his new method, his faculty
psychology, and his conception of rhetoric.
Bacon's refutation of received learning involves a complete rejection of all
traditional philosophy and itsmethods and aims - for these traditions are, inBacon's
estimation, "merely systems for thenice ordering and setting forth of things already
invented; notmethods of invention or directions for further use" i^orks Vin 68). Bacon
argues that it is "idle toexpect any great advancement inscience from the superinducing
andengrafting of newthings upon old,"and thus we"mustbegin anew from thevery
foundations" (^orks Vin 74). As such, Bacon intends to reform entirely all traditional
knowledge, including therhetorical tradition, in terms of his vision for a new science that
unites knowledge-in-action.
Bacon's new science is one to be controlled by observation and experimentation
andcommanded by thetwin powers of contemplation and operation. Theendpurpose of
the science is to be the production of works and thepromotion of power. Bacon's new
method is intended to direct knowledge "which respects theuse andobjects of the faculties'
(Works Vm 60) from its origins in sense-experience through the intellectual faculties - the
understanding, thereason, and thewill- to a conclusion in theadvancement of works.
The mind first experiences namralphenomena through the senses and apprehends and
abstracts these experiences through the understanding. The initial impressions are then
transmitted and stored in the memory. Thesemental images are sent over by way of the
imagination to the reason for judgment. And once a decision has beenmade, the
imagination sends the decisionover to thewill so thatvoluntary action can takeplace. The
newmethodis designedto direct the faculties of the scientist from theobservation of
particulars to further experimentation andfinally to theformulation of general universal
axioms. By way of this method only, "may we hope well of the sciences, when in a just
scale of ascent, and by successive steps not interruptedor broken, we rise from particulars
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to lesser axioms; and then tomiddle axioms,one above the other, and last of all to the most
general" {Works VHI137-38). The method must be used, though, not justfor proving or
discovering first principles, but also for producingworks.
The goal of the new science, a new assurance of works andpowers (J^^orks Vin
113), cannotbe toomuchemphasized. An individual mustpursue through the
understanding inventive acts and then employ the imagination to turn these overto the
reason for judgment. At thispoint, however, reasoned speculation in itselfdoesnotmeet
the requirements advanced byBacon for his new science. Bacon, asnoted, asserts that one
ruleor guidance for thenew science is that it dispose or lead to action (^orks VKI170).
Bacon also saysthat"the imagination is as it were the director anddrivef*of voluntary
action, "insomuch that when the image which is the object of the motion is withdrawn the
motionitself is immediately interrupted and stopped (as in walking, if you begin to think
eagerly andfixedly of something else, you immediately stand still)" (Works IX 55). Thus
theimagination mustbeemployed again to address thedictates of thereason to thewill and
thus to make further active experimentation possibleand in tum give rise to other
discoveries and lead to practical works.
As Bacon states that human,knowledge and human power, or contemplation and
works, are one in his theoryof science, so too the faculties of the intellect and the will are
in his words "twins by birth," as one procures truth and the other actions {Works IX 60).
And as the faculties of the understanding, the reason, and the will correspond in Bacon's
systemto the intellectual arts of invention, judgment, andelocution, the real significance of
rhetoric's position in the new science becomesmore readily apparent. Bacon finds
Aristotle to be right to "place rhetoric as betweenlogic on the one side, and moral or civil
knowledge on the other, as participating in both" {Advancement II141). Bacon himself
both calls rhetoric an intellectual art and situates it uniquely to influence the will. Rhetoric
works to reinstate the reason by freeing it from the seditionsof the affections and "well-
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graced forms" and by using the force ofpersuasion tocreate images so that "upon the
revolt of theimagination reason prevaileth" (Advancement 11141). The enlistment of
rhetoric is thus integral to Bacon'ssystem of scientific invention, as rhetoric alone is
situated precisely to utilize theimagination onbehalf of thereason and generate an image so
as toprompt thewiU andprocure thedesired voluntary motion. If knowledge is to be
capitalized upon in the realm ofa new active science, the individual must beaided by
rhetoric to determine the best line of action for further investigation and experimentation.
Thespecific function Bacon assigns to rhetoric within his system andhisdefinition
of theart in terms of hisfaculty psychology reveals forus amore complex conception of
rhetoric's operation than thescholarship has allowed. Rhetoric stands at thecenter of
Bacon's faculty psychology between speculative thought andpractical actionand thus
serves an essential function in the methodof scientific investigation and the inventionof
knowledge. Wallace asserts repeatedly that inBacon's system the mind employs faculties
so as to perceive andunderstand, inferand determine, picture and remember, desire and
will, "all with thepurpose of allowing man either toknow or to act"{Francis Bacon7). I
Would argue, then, that becauseBacon's plan for a reconstmction of science is basedon a
unionbetween these twooperations (toknowand to act), it requires an alliance between the
faculties of the understanding, the reason, and the will.
Even whileWallace at one point argues thatBacon posits a separationbetween die
faculties that operateto producetrueknowledge in the realmof science and those that
operate to secure good actions in the realm of ethics (Nature 19), he recognizes later that
Bacon conceives of the individual as a "unit or whole engaged in conduct that demands his
entire being, not a segment or single faculty thereof (20). I would argue that the faculties
and their operations are closely linked andmutuallydependent and that Bacon's system of
sciences depends upon a close working relationship between the understanding and reason,
which produce "position or decree" and the will, whichproduces "action or execution."
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Becausethe aim of the Bacon's new science requires a unity of contemplative, theoretical
study anditspractical, active consequences, and because rhetoric alone works within
Bacon's systemof faculty psychology torender knowledge effective for rational action, I
wouldargue finally thatrhetoricoccupies a central stage in Bacon's plan for the
developmentof science and the advancementof learning.
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CONCLUSION
Bacon'sphilosophical writings proposed a reform forexisting universities by
setting forth a new method bywhich knowledge would beincreased both in theory and in
usethrough continuous investigation and experimentation. His design for thisreform was
to be setout in a sixfold plan for theGreat Instauration. AsAnderson points out,however,
the "writings Bacon leaves in representation ofhis Great Instauration are notmany; and
none of them is both complete and adequate" (34). He notes:
Not a few of the writings are begun and then suddenly suspended,
sometimes to be incorporated into later documents, Mostof theearlier
pieces are tentative in character; hardly any are complete. When considered
together, theyare seen to abound in cross-reference andrepetition.
And.. .the author, becauseof publicduties, physical infirmity, and anxiety
to publish some pieces in representation ofparts of the Instauration, finds it
necessary to amendor combine forpublication earlierwritings in lieu of
more satisfactory works. (38)
Anyattempt todetermine the specific nature ofBacon'sscheme must recognize that
Bacon's works do not present a systematicmethodor final philosophy. Neither do the
works provide a developed, systematic theory of rhetoric. Wallace states thatwhile there
aremultitudes of suggestions as to the natureofBacon's conception of rhetoric scattered
throughout the works, as it becomesapparent thatBacon's various reiriarks do not present
a completerhetorical theory, scholars must try to present an orderlypicture by selecting
"what appears to be the properpoint of emphasis, andmust arrange relevantiy aboutit a
background that shows some balance, harmony, and perspective" (3). Bacon's
conception of rhetoric, because it is ambiguous and sketchy at best, is susceptible to many
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readings. Any attempt to evaluate thefunction rhetoric performs inBacon's plan, then,
remains necessity suggestive.
I have proceededwith cautious optimism in this study toexplore yet another
readingofBacon's view of rhetoric, one that elevates the status ofrhetoric inBacon's
scheme. Myprimary concern in exploring analternate reading has been to argue that
rhetoric'sfunction in Bacon's plan should beconceived notmerely as ornamental nor
solely as a moral andethical, butshould be seen, rather, ascentral to scientific invention. I
have argued thatBacon recognizes the limitations of rhetoric conceived of asmerely style
and ornamentationand that he therefore re-defines rhetoricas an operationvital to securing
knowledge-in-action. I haveasserted, further, that theconcept of action is essential to
Bacon's definition of science and that rhetoric's operation to secure action is thus vital to
ongoing scientific invention. I am acutely aware that myownreading can bebut
suggestive, as it too is inextricably bound to theambiguity thatemerges from Bacon's
works. However, I believe that my interpretationsand conclusions concerning Bacon's
view of rhetoric hold some value for viewing the present status of the rhetoric and the
relation between rhetoric and the sciences in our universities.
Since the turn of this century higher education has accepted the idea of theGerman
university, yielded to a dominant interest in science and technology,and revised the
curriculumto advance an electivesystem thathas facilitated departmentalization and
specialization. As AlbertKitzhaber has documented, rhetoric duringthisperioddeclined
steadily as it becamemore isolatedandrestricted - and it has neverfully recovered its status
in relation to other arts and sciences. The foundation of disciplines of knowledge and the
related rigid specializationin research have impingedupon us decisions about the prestige
and status of knowledge that continue to contributeto disciplinary conflicts and territorial
disputesas departments continueto compete in harsh economic conditions for students and
resources. Such divisive educational practices are inevitably impoverishing.
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Myargument in this study is finally one ofemphasis. The existing scholarship has
emphasized thedistinctions Bacon makes between various arts in his scheme. It asserts
repeatedly that Bacon sees science and rhetoric asseparate activities and assigns the
methodology of science and theartofrhetoric each toitsown province, setofffrom the
other byits own particular function. I would argue that the treatment of rhetoric asan
activity isolated fromscience haseffectively leftit in a fallout, struggling for somenarrow
space within the ranks of arts and sciences in the university hierarchy. And I believe that
thediscipline of rhetoric might bestbenefit if wenow re-view Bacon'sconception of
rhetoric andwork to emphasize the interrelatedness of the arts. I would argue, finally, that
if we act with an accurate understandingof Bacon's position, wemight stress the links
between rhetoric and science.
Wormald says that"Baconembraced andmaintained theposition thatno field of
study ... could successfullybe investigated in isolation" (40). According to Bacon, the
means for greatest discovery requires the strength of a perfect unity of all the arts and
sciences. He insisted that narrow specialization would hinder discovery's progress.
Purver notes too that Bacon believed "there should be no artificial division between any of
the branchesof knowledge themselves, for the arrangement of knowledgeinto arts and
sciences wasmerely a convenient wayof organizing whatwas in fact related" (51). Bacon
directed much of his criticism against the barriers that are often erected between the
sciences. He states that he finds it a great impediment towards the advancement and further
invention of knowledge, that particular arts and sciences have been "severed and cut off
from the stem" of general knowledge i^orks Vm 140). He refers specifically to Cicero's
complaint against Socrates that he was the first to separatephilosophy and rhetoric and thus
leave rhetoric "an empty and verbal art." And he asserts, rather: "generally let this be the
rule, that all partitions of knowledge be acceptedrather for lines and veins, than for
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